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NADIA E. NEDZEL* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Rule of Law and economic development have long been recognized 
as being inter-related – a successful society has both.  The question is how 
the two are related. Some scholars argue that common law is more 
supportive of economic development, while others reject this and argue that 
the distinctions between common law and civil law have no effect on 
economic development. This multidisciplinary article approaches the issue 
from a new contextual perspective that includes economics, philosophy, 
history, and law.  It posits that while the concepts are similar, the common 
law conception of the Rule of Law (as opposed to the civilian, Rechtsstaat 
or L’État de Droit) is historically more supportive of economic development 
for understandable reasons.  
This article does NOT argue that common law is ‘better’ than civil law. 
This article does show, however, that from Henry II to Brexit, the common 
law has traditionally been based on a different relationship between the 
individual and government: a non-instrumental relationship focused on 
problem-solving that encourages entrepreneurship and hence economic 
development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While “international” is included in the title, it is something of a 
misnomer. “International” definitions of the Rule of Law, such as that 
developed by the World Justice Project, are inaccurate.  They may be good 
descriptions of a functioning legal system, but do not describe the concept 
of the Rule of Law. The World Bank has recognized a connection between 
the Rule of Law and economic development, noting that countries remain 
undeveloped because they lack efficient legal systems. In the 1990’s, the 
World Bank insisted that countries who wanted to receive its financial 
support were required to implement Rule of Law programs, by which it 
meant independent judicial systems.  With expenditures of $850 million and 
a success rate of 63%, by 2012, the Bank recognized that its program was 
underperforming and revised it.  Its new direction in justice reform is as 
follows: 
The Bank’s Updated GAC Strategy points out that one of the 
functions of a capable state is to dispense justice, and recognizes that 
justice institutions (i) assist in countering corruption, (ii) support 
oversight and monitoring of the executive’s actions, (iii) help ensure 
that the government is accountable to citizens, and (iv) facilitate 
constructive engagement between state and non-state actors. The 
Strategy also notes that the judiciary is among those institutions that 
not only respond to, but also help create, change, and sustain the 
‘rules of the game,’ that is, the institutional environment in which 
development takes place.1 
In turning its focus from independent judiciaries to justice institutions, 
corruption, and accountability, the World Bank is acknowledging that its 
1990’s conception of the Rule of Law was insufficient, and that while an 
independent judiciary is important, governments must be held accountable 
to their citizens by means of some “institutional environment.”2  
Similarly, since 2014, the World Justice Project, which measures its 
conception of the Rule of Law in approximately 111 countries around the 
world, now provides seed money to support practical “on-the-ground 
programs addressing discrimination, corruption, violence, and more.”3 The 
 
 
1 BIEBESHEIMER  ET AL., THE WORLD BANK:  NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUSTICE REFORM  1 (Daniel 
Adler et al., eds., 2012), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/928641468338516754/pdf/706400REPLACEM0Justice0R
eform0Final.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Our Approach: Engagement, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-
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450 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:447 
 
 
 
World Justice Project describes the Rule of Law as being comprised of four 
universal principles:  
1. The government as well as private actors are accountable under the 
law. 
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; 
and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and 
property and certain core human rights. 
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and 
enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient. 
4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent 
representatives and neutrals who are accessible, have adequate 
resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.4 
At best, this is a description of an effective legal system, largely 
described initially by Lon Fuller’s King Rex5 (with the addition of positive 
rights language). Lon Fuller lists eight characteristics of an effective legal 
system,6 but his list is not a definition of the Rule of Law.  Terms like “fair” 
and “ethical” are normative and hence render the World Justice Project’s 
definition somewhat circular.  Nevertheless, the World Justice Project’s 
new focus on practicality and effectiveness shows more of a common-law 
spontaneous order ‘do what works’ approach, rather than a cookie-cutter 
‘do it our way’ approach. While both NGO’s support the Rule of Law and 
see a connection between it and economic development (or the lack thereof), 
neither has ever effectively defined the concept nor fully explained it. 
THE RULE OF LAW 
In his beautiful parable about King Rex, Lon Fuller postulated that the 
law should consist of (1) general rules that are (2) publicly promulgated; (3) 
prospective; (4) understandable; (5) non-contradictory; (6) possible to 
comply with; (7) stable; and (8) administered as announced.7
 
In addition to 
listing characteristics of an effective legal system, his explanation, however, 
relates primarily to legislated law, which has become regarded as primary 
law in most modern legal systems (particularly those with a civilian 
 
 
us/overview/our-approach, (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
4 What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-
us/overview/what-rule-law, (last visited June 30, 2017). 
5 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-44 (Revised Ed. Yale Univ. Press 1969). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 39 (listing eight ways to fail to make law, conversion to positive list by author). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
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heritage) and is incorporated into the World Justice Project’s definition 
previously discussed. The Rule of Law, however, goes beyond those eight 
principles, beyond the mechanics of government set forth in a Constitution, 
and it also goes beyond legislative law.   
Regarding law as primarily emanating from legislation and 
administration is deleterious to economic development. Economist 
Friedrich Hayek, philosopher Bruno Leoni, and law professor Philip 
Hamburger all warned that excessive legislation and administrative law are 
deleterious to the Rule of Law and economic development. Max Weber was 
concerned that bureaucracy would come to control modern life.8 Hayek 
warned that an ever-increasing bureaucracy is dangerous to liberty.9 Leoni 
cautioned that while many regard legislation as a “quick, rational, and far-
reaching remedy against every kind of evil as compared with, say, judicial 
decisions” and alternative dispute resolution, people fail to notice that 
legislative remedies can be “too quick to be efficacious,” too unpredictable, 
and too directly connected with the views and interests of a handful of 
people such as legislators and lobbyists to provide effective remedies for 
society’s ills.10 Hamburger reiterates that out-of-control administrative law, 
i.e. the “deep state,” while initially most burdensome on economic 
development, also intrudes on the full range of American life including 
political participation and personal decisions.11  This administrative power 
was created by a combination of Congress’s repeated authorization and 
acquiescence combined with judicial deference.12 
The positivist’s attempt to reduce law to legislation13 and the 
administrative state are products of the desire to base government on a social 
technology that would control all institutions in society, including the 
market economy. Hernando de Soto’s empirical research shows that Weber 
 
 
8 Sociologist Max Weber was the first to study bureaucracy and famously argued that it is necessary 
to maintain order, maximize efficiency, and eliminate favoritism in modern society. See MAX WEBER, 
ECONOMY & SOCIETY 1002 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978).  However, 
Weber also saw unfettered bureaucracy as a threat to individual freedom, potentially trapping individuals 
in what was effectively an impersonal iron cage of rule-based, rational control. See a discussion of Max 
Weber’s thoughts on bureaucracy and its role in society in the definition of bureaucracy provided in 
RICHARD SWEDBERG & OLA AGEVALL, THE MAX WEBER DICTIONARY: KEY WORDS AND CENTRAL 
CONCEPTS 18-21 (Stanford Univ. Press 2005).   
9 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS (Bruce Caldwell ed., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 10th ed. 2007) (1944) [Hereinafter HAYEK, SERFDOM].  
10 BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 7 (Liberty Fund Expanded 3d ed. 1991). 
11 PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 1-2 (2017) (“THREAT” ). See also PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, Introduction, in IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) (describing how, due to 
judicial deference, administrative power has become absolute, unlawful, and unconstitutional). 
12 THREAT, supra note 11, at 62. 
13 Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and Hayek’s concerns were apt – that an overgrowth of top-down 
bureaucracy and legislation leads inexorably to decreased economic liberty 
and corruption in government.14   
Despite its unacknowledged emphasis on legislation as the source of law, 
the World Bank’s new direction implicitly acknowledges that judicial 
guarantees form a significant part of the Rule of Law.  In fact, however, it 
was judicial guarantees that in large part created the Rule of Law in 
England.  Parliament originally used legislation only rarely, and only to 
limit the Crown’s power or pass new taxes, as with the Magna Carta or the 
Statement of Liberties.15 In contrast, individuals traditionally had recourse 
only to the courts, and it was the English King’s courts and traditional 
 
 
14 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS 
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 106 (Basic Books 2000) [hereinafter “MYSTERY”]. By 
studying how the U.S. property and business registration systems developed and comparing them with 
the systems in Peru and elsewhere, de Soto posited that while third world countries don’t lack law, the 
poor inhabitants of these nations lack the process to represent their property and create capital.  They 
have houses but not titles, crops but not deeds, businesses but not statutes of incorporation.  It is the 
unavailability of these essential representations that explains why they cannot produce sufficient capital 
to make capitalism work.  Id. at 7.  In contrast, in the United States, rather than generating top-down 
legislation, social contracts born outside the official law in the nineteenth century were acknowledged 
as a legitimate source of law and ways were found to absorb these contracts. Id. at 106.  See also 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 152—187  
(Harper & Row 1989) [hereinafter “THE OTHER PATH”]. Chapter five of de Soto’s The Other Path details 
the enormous costs of complying with Peruvian bureaucratic requirements whether opening a business 
or buying land, as well as the costs and waste of operating an informal business (i.e. outside of legal 
regulations) in Peru.   
15 See ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 71, 206 (Liberty Fund 1986). In order 
to meet his promise to follow Magna Carta and not assess taxes without common assent of the entire 
kingdom, Edward I (1272-1307) frequently called meetings, known as parliaments, of nobles and 
commoners from all areas of England. These meetings served several purposes: 1) they informed the 
nobility, clergy, and shire representative about royal policies, administrative procedures, and matters 
affecting the safety of the realm, 2) they allowed the king to secure the consent of the community to new 
legislation, and 3) they secured consent to new taxes. Custom carried the greatest authority in the Middle 
Ages, but new laws and taxes were entirely different matters, and a parliament or something like it was 
essential for obtaining a grant of taxes such as the one that enacted the Statute of Westminster, which 
granted Edward I (1272-1307) a tax on wells, woolfells, and leather. Id. at 71.  Over time, Parliament 
acquired the right to approve and give consent to new laws and taxes beyond customary feudal dues and 
services, though in the thirteenth century, the functions of Parliament, the law courts, and the king’s 
council could not readily be distinguished from one another. Id. at 206. Parliament began meeting in 
1295. ALFRED L. BROWN, THE GOVERNANCE OF LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1272–1461 (Hodder 
Arnold 1989).  Parliament gained legislative supremacy after the Glorious Revolution of 1689. See 
Anthony Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament: Form or Substance?, in JEFFREY JOWELL & DAWN 
OLIVER, THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION  28 (Oxford Univ. Press 6 ed. 2007). See also THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 51 (Liberty Fund 1956) (discussing Sir 
Edward Coke’s decision in Dr. Bonham’s case (the foundation of judicial review). “Urged by a 
presentiment of the coming conflict of Crown and Parliament, he felt the necessity of curbing the rising 
arrogance of both and looked back upon his country’s legal history to find the means.  This instinctive 
appeal to history for guidance was characteristic, and the choice of a legal rather than any other solution 
was amply justified by the remarkable continuity and stability of English law during the vicissitudes of 
the seventeenth century.” Id. “The solution which Coke found was in the idea of a fundamental law 
which limited Crown and Parliament indifferently.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
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customs that enforced contract, property, and succession law, and created 
such mechanisms as habeas corpus (among other things) to limit the King’s 
power.16 Legislation was not used to limit an individual’s freedom of action, 
and in fact the English sense of individualism has been embedded in the 
culture and English common law since at least the fifteenth century.17 
In contrast with what constitutes an effective legal system, however, the 
Rule of Law can properly be more viewed as a meta-norm, a cultural 
understanding about the legal system and man’s relationship to it.  Properly 
construed, it has two components: 1) law and order and 2) limited 
government.18  The law and order component predicates that individuals 
have impliedly consented to obey the rules because it is to their benefit to 
do so and because they will otherwise be punished.  In doing so, it puts 
individuals first, not a collectivity. Limited government means both equal 
application of the law and that the government’s powers are limited. 
While A.V. Dicey popularized the term “Rule of Law,”19 the distinctive 
relationship between the English and their law and government developed 
spontaneously centuries earlier.  Hayek and Oakeshott more fully captured 
a definition of the concept and the kind of legal culture that developed and 
supports it.  Hayek described the Rule of Law as meaning that “government 
in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand--rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will 
use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual 
 
 
16 See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY: 
AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ENGLISH LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN 
ENGLAND  44 (Yale Univ. Press 1910) (quoted in Book Review, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 330, 331 (1911) (“the 
common law was thus in the main the product of a court, not of a legislature”). 
17 See ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 177-78, 180 (Basil 
Blackwell 1978). “[W]hen considering the Commonwealth of [sixteenth century] England, one was 
dealing with a land filled with free men, who had of their own free will agreed to live together.  It was 
an association of equals based on contract, not a kingdom of subjects ruled by a superior monarch . . . .” 
“The major legal differences flowed from the differences between Civil (Roman) law, and English 
Common Law:  the differences in methods of trial, the use of juries, the absence of torture in England, 
the use of sheriffs in the political process.”  
18 Nadia E. Nedzel, The Rule of Law: Its History and Meaning in Common Law, Civil Law, and 
Latin American Judicial Systems, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 57, 58-61 (2010). See also HAYEK, 
SERFDOM, supra note 9, at 112 (discussing the importance of both formal law and the importance of 
government being bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand) and  Todd J.  Zywicki, The Rule of 
Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (stating that “the Rule of Law 
contains three basic values or concepts: (1) constitutionalism; (2) rule-based decision-making; and (3) a 
commitment to neutral principles, such as federalism, separation of powers, and textualism,” a definition 
very much like the author’s. In using the term “constitutionalism,” Professor Zywicki is referring to 
limited government, and in the concept of a “commitment to neutral principles,” he discusses the 
importance of Oakeshott’s civil association). 
19 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION lv 
(Liberty Classics 1982) (1915). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”20 Hayek further posited that law, 
like the free market, developed spontaneously.21 Oakeshott’s insights were 
consistent with this. He posited that the Rule of Law presupposes a civil 
association, where the law does not favor any individual or group over any 
other individual or group.22 In a secular world of moral pluralism, where 
people’s views of morality differ, this approach allows for the greatest 
tolerance and freedom. In other words, the Rule of Law is a-political and 
non-instrumental, and the law applies equally to all, including those in the 
government.   
Common law rights are ‘negative.’23 In other words, individuals have a 
general right to be free from governmental interference, unless they are 
intruding on another individual’s freedom. These rights are indefeasible, or 
inalienable, and include only “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” 
and precede any governmental power.24 As listed in the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence, these fundamental rights are drawn almost directly from 
 
 
20 HAYEK, SERFDOM, supra note 9, at 112. 
21 See Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF F. A. HAYEK (Univ. Chicago Press 1988). In the Fatal Conceit, Hayek posited that the extended or 
spontaneous order of a market economy provides a more efficient allocation of societal resources than 
any design could achieve and is superior to any order that a human mind could design because the human 
mind cannot by itself aggregate the necessary data. In a market economy, price is the aggregation of 
information acquired by individuals, thus allowing those dealing in a commodity to make decisions 
based on more information than they could acquire personally or from any centralized authority.  Thus, 
the market economy’s inherent efficiency benefits the whole society. 
Hayek saw the strength and usefulness of spontaneous order in much more than just economics.  
See also FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 21, 51-52 (Univ. Chicago Press 1973). 
In Volume 1 of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek posits that what he termed ‘constructivist 
rationalism’ – i.e. positivism – is a false view of all social institutions, including law.  He argues that 
constructivist rationalism, by which he means the civilian concept that all law can be logically derived 
from a priori premises and should be a deliberate construction ‘based on empirical knowledge’ of how 
it will affect the achievement of human purposes (i.e. legislated law; Id. at 21.) contrasts with the 
spontaneous legal rules that developed out of judicial habit for whom law and liberty cannot exist apart 
from one another. (Id. at 51-52.  
22 MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, The Rule of Law, in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1986). See also 
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, On the Civil Condition, in ON HUMAN CONDUCT 108-130 (Clarendon Press 
1990) (explaining civil association and how it relates to law). 
23 See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 858-62 (2002) 
(describing positive rights as (ineffective) rights to health, housing, clothing, etc., as contrasting with 
the negative rights provided in the United States Constitution, which show a pragmatic understanding 
of the operation of government). See also John Hasnas, From Cannibalism to Caesareans: Two 
Conceptions of Fundamental Rights, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 900, 901 (1995) (describing classical (i.e. 
negative) rights as “indefeasible, morally fundamental entities that protect individual autonomy,” and 
contrasting them with contemporary (i.e. positive) rights as means to the achievement of more 
fundamental moral interests) and John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 199 
(1995). 
24 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). The four organic laws are 
the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and 
the United States Constitution. All four are reproduced in full at the front of every copy of 
the United States Code.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
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John Locke’s conception of natural rights.25 It is this kind of society, a civil 
association in which government is regarded as subservient to law, which 
generally fosters strong and continuous entrepreneurship and economic 
development. Individuals develop respect for the law as separate from those 
people who dominate the government, they expect and demand that the 
government obey and apply the law, and they have as a result an implicit 
belief that not only will the law not interfere unduly with their 
entrepreneurial efforts, but also that they can rely on that law to protect their 
economic enterprises.   
Oakeshott contrasts civil association with the term enterprise 
association, in which a group of people is held together and driven by a 
common goal.26 Consequently, according to Oakeshott, anytime a 
government enacts instrumentalist laws necessary to pursue a goal such as 
improving society or defeating an enemy, it is inevitably limiting freedom.27 
While all governments at times must become enterprise associations (for 
example, in times of war), in order to maximize protection for liberty and 
respect for the individual, government must be limited, and its role 
circumscribed, thus the Rule of Law involves obligations to subscribe to 
non-instrumental rules,28 as opposed to enterprise associations where a state 
is understood as being in pursuit of a common substantive purpose, directed 
by an “enlightened” custodian, whose laws are instruments for determining 
priorities such as who should benefit from a redistribution of taxes.29  
Oakeshott posits that such states are ruled by some kind of sumptuary policy 
devised and enforced by a bureaucracy, and as a consequence, are inherently 
self-defeating in their quest for economic prosperity.30 This does not mean 
that Hayek and Oakeshott were libertarians or endorsing laissez faire: “It is 
important not to confuse opposition against this kind of planning as a laissez 
faire attitude . . . government must make best possible use of the forces of 
competition as a means of coordinating human efforts . . . .”31 American 
Legal Philosopher Lon Fuller also advocated civil association, though he 
did not use that term:32 “law furnishes a baseline for self-directed action, not 
 
 
25 Hasnas, Cannibalism, supra note 23, at 911-912.  A very similar conception is listed in France’s 
Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789). Unfortunately, as contrasted to the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence, the French Declaration has never been regarded as a source of law in France.  
26 MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 111-113 (discussing “civil association”), 114-116 
(discussing “enterprise association”) (Clarendon Press 1990). 
27 See id. at 167. 
28 OAKESHOTT, The Rule of Law, supra note 22, at 161.  
29 Id. at 166-167. 
30 Id. at 167. 
31 See HAYEK, SERFDOM, supra note 9, at 85. 
32 See LON FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 70-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a detailed set of instructions for accomplishing specific objectives.”33 Thus, 
in spelling out the formal conditions for the Rule of Law, its “inner 
morality,” he posited that government, properly conceived, does not 
advocate for any particular group or mythical whole and that the only reality 
is the individual. Under the Rule of Law, there is no general will 
(Rousseau’s term) or common good, though there may be governmental 
projects, such as bridges and roads, designed to benefit all.  
In contrast with the common law concept, the continental version of the 
Rule of Law, more correctly called by its German name “Rechtsstaat,” and 
more accurately translated as the legal state or Rule Through Law, regards 
government both “as the representative of the general will” by means of its 
enforcement of legislated law, and as having “its own particular will (based 
on the subjective right to command).”34 As currently envisioned, the civil 
law conception of government has, as its goal, the development and 
promotion of human welfare, including such things as housing, health, 
education, and transportation along with respect for and protection of the 
dignity of man.35 Rechtsstaat thus provides individuals with positive rights, 
which are offset by the duties and obligations individuals owe society. 
Because Rechtsstaat holds that government’s role is to improve society, it 
thus regards government as an enterprise association (in Oakeshottian 
terms), and de-emphasizes individual freedom.   
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
Common law countries tend to have greater economic, business, and 
labor freedom; greater governmental stability; and more consistent, long-
term economic growth than do civil law countries as demonstrated by 
comparison of the Heritage Fund's Economic Freedom of the World map, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Index, and the World Justice 
Project’s Rule of Law Index.36 The countries that rated highest on the 2008 
 
 
72 (Duke Univ. Press 1981) (describing two principles of association:  1) commitment as shared 
interests, similar to Oakeshott’s enterprise association, and 2) legal principle or association by 
reciprocity, similar to Oakeshott’s civil association.  See also id. at 67, editor’s note stating that Fuller 
“favored a conception of legislation which views laws as baselines for the self-directed pursuits of 
citizens, securing only the minimal restraints on conduct necessary for continuing interaction.”   
33 FULLER, supra note 5, at 210.    
34 Mireille Hildebrandt, Justice and Police: Regulatory Offenses and the Criminal Law, 12 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 43, 59 (2009). 
35 Id.  
36 Compare 2013 Economic Freedom of the World Heat Map, HERITAGE FUND, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/heatmap (last visited July 1, 2013), with 2011 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). See also Nedzel, supra note 18, at 60 (showing composite maps with 2010 data and sources cited 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
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Rule of Law Index were also among the richest and most economically free 
(Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway, United States).37 In the 2016 Rule 
of Law Index, the countries that rated highest again included some 
Scandinavian countries, but also Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Germany, and the United States.38  Sharing the top with scores 
between .74 (US) and .89 (Denmark) are newcomers Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Czech Republic, and Estonia (among others).39  Nevertheless, the 
percentage of common law countries at the top far exceeds their percentage 
as type of legal system.  Roughly 10% of countries regard themselves as 
having a primarily common law heritage, but they comprise 7 of the top 18 
countries listed in the World Justice Project, or 39% of the top 18 countries.  
In terms of the 2017 Economic Freedom index, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
New Zealand, Switzerland, and Australia ranked as free, while “mostly 
free” included Canada, Ireland, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom.40  Thus, common law countries comprised 80% of the 
economically “free” countries, and 8 out of 34, or 24% of free or mostly 
free countries.  
In addition to having consistently higher listings in the two indices, 
common law-heritage countries tend to perform better economically over 
time. Economist Svetozar Pejovich analyzed the development of capitalism, 
economic freedom, and performance in common law as opposed to other 
countries in 2008.41 Pejovich’s analysis and comparison of the Index of 
Economic Freedom with the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the 
World concluded that Anglo-American capitalism was doing better than 
Continental capitalism, with its greater governmental dependency. Pejovich 
noted that the two indexes have technical limitations and methodological 
problems, but because they have been relied on by scholars, investors, and 
the countries themselves they have some authority and reliability.  Both 
indexes confirmed that the freer a country is, the better its economic 
performance over a long period of time.42 In the decade between 1997 and 
2006, there was a trend toward more economic freedom, and those countries 
 
 
therein). The exact placements vary from year to year, but common law countries stay towards the top. 
37 See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2012-2013 
(2013), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf 
38 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016, at 5 (2016), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital_0.pdf. 
39 Id. 
40 2017 Economic Freedom of the World Heat Map, HERITAGE FUND,  
http://www.heritage.org/index/heatmap (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).  
41 SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:  THE CASE FOR 
COMMON LAW ix-xi (Edward Elgar 2008). 
42 Id. at 97. 
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that increased their economic freedom the most, experienced the highest 
average economic growth.   
Furthermore, Pejovich’s study suggested that, relative to civil codes, the 
incentive effects of common law are more efficiency-friendly. He separated 
Western capitalist countries into two groups.  The first group consisted of 
countries in which common law is a dominant legal system: the United 
States, England, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  He excluded 
Hong Kong and Singapore because it was not clear to him whether they 
were fully part of Western civilization at that time.  The second group of 
countries included all Western countries that use civil law:  Portugal, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, 
Austria, Sweden, and Denmark.  Pejovich excluded Greece (because it was 
dominated by the Ottoman Empire for centuries), Finland, which remained 
between West and East, and Norway, which uses both common law and 
civil law.  The average scores for civil law countries in 2006 remained in 
the “mostly free” category, while common law countries were firmly in the 
“free” category.  Among the four major capitalist countries (France, 
Germany, England, and the United States), the results showed an even 
stronger case for common law:  England and the United States’ average 
score improved from 1.94 to 1.79; while France and Germany’s average 
score improved only 2/3 that much, from 2.33 to 2.23.43 The two indexes 
changed their method of grading in 2007, and Pejovich has since criticized 
some of their methodological changes as being less focused on unbiased 
analysis of economic freedom, but the results have remained generally the 
same. 
Consistent with Pejovich’s research, Hernando de Soto’s empirical 
studies demonstrate the propensity of a common law system to adopt 
simple, practical solutions to real-world problems by formalizing informal 
social contracts, thereby encouraging economic development.44 De Soto’s 
research focuses primarily on small entrepreneurs in developing civil law 
countries and  he compares their situations with those of start-up 
entrepreneurs in the United States.45 In the 1980s, de Soto compared the 
amount of time it would take to open legally a one-person seamstress shop 
or formalize ownership of land, jumping through all bureaucratic hoops. In 
Peru (his home country), de Soto found that it took 289 six-hour days at a 
cost of US $1,231 (thirty-one times the monthly minimum wage) to open a 
seamstress shop.46 , De Soto further found that it would take thirteen to 
 
 
43 Id. at 98-99. 
44 MYSTERY, supra note 14 at 105-151. 
45 Id. at 18, 20. 
46 Id. See also THE OTHER PATH, supra note 14 at 134. 
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twenty-five years and 168 steps to formalize ownership of urban property 
in the Philippines,47 six to fourteen years in Egypt,48 and ten to twelve years 
to lease government land in Haiti.49 In contrast, he found that in the U.S., it 
took a few weeks and less than $1000 to open a seamstress shop in most 
states.50 (It would probably take less than that now, using such online 
programs as Legal Zoom.) The U.S. formalized ownership of property in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century by adopting laws that accepted and 
recognized preexisting social contracts. For example, squatters’ rights were 
recognized and legally provided for via land script51, the Pre-emption Act, 
and the Homestead Act.52 
De Soto’s main message in Mystery was that no nation’s market 
economy can be strong if it does not have an efficient, inexpensive, and 
simple system for recording property ownership and other economic 
information.53 When small entrepreneurs in developing countries cannot 
easily record ownership of their business or property, they cannot obtain 
credit or insurance,  sell the business or expand; nor can they seek legal 
redress for business conflicts, and they live in fear of detection by corrupt 
government officials.54 The lack of information on income and property 
ownership also means that that  government cannot effectively and 
efficiently collect taxes on those businesses, nor do they have a database for 
investment decisions in health care, education, or environmental planning.55 
The exclusion of large numbers of small businesses creates two parallel 
economies: legal and extra-legal or formal and informal. The elite legal 
minority enjoys the economic benefits of the law and globalization, while 
the illegal majority is stuck in poverty because their assets languish as dead 
capital.56 The enemy in developing countries is over-grown bureaucracy—
flawed legal systems that make it virtually impossible to gain a stake in the 
market. People in such countries may have talent, enthusiasm, and an 
 
 
47 MYSTERY, supra note 14, at 20. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 21. 
50 Key Concepts, POWER OF THE POOR, www.thepowerofthepoor.com/concepts/c7.php (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2017). 
51 Land scrip(t) was the U.S. government’s habit of issuing paper redeemable in land.  Between 
1780 and 1848, Congress provided two million acres of land for soldiers who fought in the Revolution, 
five million to veterans of the War of 1812, and 13 million for those who fought the war with Mexico.  
MYSTERY, supra note 14, at 125. 
52 See generally MYSTERY, supra note 14, at 106–151 (describing the history of U.S. property law). 
53 See Hernando de Soto, The Destruction of Economic Facts, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 
2, 2011, at 60, 60 (explaining the importance of comprehensive public records). 
54 MYSTERY, supra note 14 at 155. 
55 Id. at 196. 
56 Id. at 6. 
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astonishing ability to wring a profit out of practically nothing, but they are 
not able to expand their businesses because they cannot operate within their 
existing overly-burdensome legal systems.57  
De Soto has since put more thought into the evils of overgrown 
bureaucracy. He posits “that bureaucracy and corruption go hand in hand . 
. . not due to [local] culture but rather to political structure”:58  
There appears to be a tradition among [Peru’s] lawmakers of using 
the law to redistribute wealth rather than to help create it... A state 
which does not realize that wealth and resources can grow and be 
promoted by an appropriate system of institutions, and that even the 
humblest members of the population can generate wealth, finds direct 
redistribution the only acceptable approach.  
Tolerance of this kind of systemic political corruption eventually 
becomes part of the culture.59 
Thus, in these kinds of systems, businesspeople spend time and money 
jockeying for position with government leaders, so that their businesses will 
be favored by laws that eliminate competition or give them government 
funds, rather than focusing on developing innovations that will serve their 
customers better and enhance their competitive edge. A legal system whose 
sole purpose is to redistribute benefits serves neither rich nor poor and only 
those who have close political ties will remain in the market.60 Laws in these 
systems are based primarily on who will benefit and how, not on ethics or 
marketplace realities. Many governments pass tens of thousands of laws 
every year, increasing bureaucracy and creating more and more obstacles 
for those not close to political power. Naturally, bureaucrats want to 
maintain their positions and object to any change that might erode their 
influence, and especially in the developing world, they use their positions 
as toll booths to enrich themselves—the essence of corruption.61 As 
corruption grows, both the integrity of the law and prosperity are destroyed. 
The phenomenon of ever-increasing bureaucracy is not exclusive to the 
developing world: de Soto points out that many (if not most) Western 
countries are marching down this same self-destructive path.  
De Soto’s work concerns primarily small companies, and while one 
might think that a country’s economy depends on large companies, this is 
 
 
57 Key Concepts, supra note 50. 
58 Id. 
59 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 35–
36 (2008) (explaining the connection between societal norms and business environments in various 
countries). 
60 See THE OTHER PATH, supra note 14 at 189–91 (describing the redistributive tradition in Peru).  
61 See Key Concepts, supra note 50. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
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would be a mistake. In the United States, small businesses (those with less 
than five hundred employees) account for 99.7% of employer firms, 
accounted for 66.3% of new jobs created from the third quarter of 1992 until 
the third quarter of 2013, 48% of total private-sector employees, and 33.6% 
of known export value.62 Accordingly, small companies generate a 
significant portion of the U.S. economy.63 In real numbers, small businesses 
with less than five-hundred employees employ about fifty-seven million 
persons in America.64 While small businesses shut down each month, 
approximately 543,000 new businesses are started each month to replace 
those failed businesses.65 Seven out of ten “new employer firms survive at 
least 2 years, half at least 5 years, a third at least 10 years, and a quarter stay 
in business fifteen years or more.”66 There were 22.5 million non-employer 
firms (one-person businesses) in 2011, and fifty-two percent of all small 
businesses are home-based.67 
Similarly, in a study of nine countries, the European Union found that 
ninety-nine percent of its enterprises should be classified as small or 
medium enterprises or “SMEs” (i.e., employing less than 250 people).68 As 
in the U.S.,  small and medium sized enterprises are important in the 
European Union both in terms of employment and to a country’s economy, 
particularly in smaller countries.69 Nevertheless, the study found that SMEs 
are important in larger countries, such as Germany, as well, where, 
specifically in Germany, they account for forty-three percent of gross value 
added and employ thirty-four percent of the total number of persons 
employed.70  
 
 
62 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2016), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf. For more statistics on small 
businesses in the U.S., see 2016 Small Business Profiles for the States and Territories, U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/small-business-profiles-states-and-territories-
2016. 
63 See Facts & Data on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, SMALL BUSINESS & 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL, http://sbecouncil.org/about-us/facts-and-data/ (last visited Apr. 14, 
2018) (Small businesses were responsible for 46% of private nonfarm GDP in 2008—the most recent 
year for which the source data are available—and 32.9% of known export value in 2015). 
64 Jason Nazar, 16 Surprising Statistics About Small Businesses, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 10:20 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonnazar/2013/09/09/16-surprising-statistics-about-small-
businesses/. See also Frequently Asked Questions About Small Business, supra note 62 at 1. 
65 Surprising Statistics About Small Business, supra note 64. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Statistics on Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, EUROSTAT (Aug. 9, 2017, 11:16 AM), 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_small_and_medium-
sized_enterprises. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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CAPITALISM, BUSINESS, AND EMPLOYMENT 
The effect of the greater individual freedom provided by common law 
can be seen not just in greater long-term economic efficiency and economic 
freedom, but also in the breadth and depth of investors. Capitalist countries, 
whether common law or civil law, develop a wide variety of business 
organizations such as corporations, single proprietorships, producers’ 
cooperatives, labor cooperatives, associations, not-for-profit firms, 
partnerships, limited liability companies, and other forms of business 
entities. All of them were organized voluntarily, have survived competition 
from other forms of business organizations, and thus have passed an 
economic efficiency test.71  
However, corporate ownership in common law countries—especially of 
large firms—is very different from that in civil law countries. In the United 
States, as opposed to other countries, share ownership is separated from 
managerial control.72  This means that non-owner managers and directors 
control corporate assets and are responsible for the corporation’s strategies 
and tactics.73  The shareholders, a largely separate group, provide most of 
the risk capital for corporate activities. “The interlocking directorates and 
the ownership of control blocks of stock by families and corporate groups 
common in Europe and Asia are largely absent in the United States.”74 
The unique ownership structure used by U.S. corporations presents 
opportunities as well as challenges.  For example, the ability to raise vast 
sums of money from widely disparate investors democratizes capital: while 
some middle-class investors purchase stock directly, they also purchase it 
through their contributions to insurance premiums, pension funds, and 
mutual funds, thus raising billions of dollars.75 The United States would not 
have both a robust middle class and a large number of powerful, 
multinational corporations without the separation of share ownership and 
corporate management.76 
The U.S. “shareholder culture” remains unique in this way in other 
countries, even developed countries like France, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan, most big companies are controlled by powerful 
families, other corporations via complex corporate cross-
holdings of shares, large banks, and, occasionally, by 
 
 
71 See PEJOVICH, supra note 41, at 9 (defining economic efficiency). 
72 MACEY, supra note 59, at 3, 4 (emphasis added). 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
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governments themselves.  Shareholders are generally at the mercy 
of these powerful interests, and shareholders’ interests, not 
surprisingly, often are mere afterthoughts for the managers of such 
companies . . . .  
. . . .  
In the United States, as distinct from other countries, there is broad 
(though by no means universal) consensus that the corporation is and 
should be governed for the benefit of shareholders, subject only to 
the legal and contractual responsibilities of the company to third 
parties . . . . 77  
. . . .  
In [contrast, in] France, Germany, and Japan[,] most managers 
think that their primary obligation is to provide job security for 
workers . . . .78  
 
Because of these differences in regulatory structure, American 
corporations such as Apple attract large numbers of private investors. Even 
if some of the private investors are institutions such as TIAA-CREFF, which 
handles the investments of teachers’ retirement funds, such institutional 
investors are necessarily motivated to maximize economic growth. This 
requires strong protection of investors’ property rights, and also of the 
freedom of contract.   
Freedom of contract reduces the transaction costs of entry and exit from 
business, while credible property rights protect shareholders’ wealth from 
redistribution in political markets.79 Together, the two encourage the 
expansion of trade and technological innovation.80 Furthermore, strong 
 
 
77 MACEY, supra note 59, at 4. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (holding 
that Henry Ford had to operate the Ford Motor Company in the interest of maximizing profit for his 
shareholders, rather than for the benefit of his employees or customers. It is often cited as affirming the 
principle of "shareholder primacy" in corporate America). 
78 MACEY, supra note 59, at 4 (emphasis added). 
79 See PEJOVICH, supra note 41, at 86–87 (implying that protection of property rights is vitally 
important to economic development). But see CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND 
CAPITALISM:  WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 31 (2008) (arguing that property rights are not necessarily tied to 
economic development). 
80 See NICHOLAS CAPALDI & GORDON LLOYD, LIBERTY & EQUALITY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 10 
(Elgar 2016) (arguing that technology proceeds best in a market economy). A market economy requires 
limited government (limited to providing context for commercial activity such as protection of property), 
and limited government requires the Rule of Law understood as protecting individual initiative in a civil 
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protection for investors encourages individuals to become shareholders, and 
this dispersion of shareholding has many economic benefits.  For example, 
the dispersion of shares means that investors can diversify their portfolios 
and decrease risk, and thus have incentive to invest in risky ventures because 
they can offset those risks through diversification. Freedom of contract can 
also encourage the distribution of risk among a large number of people and 
thereby minimize both costs and risk. For example, Lloyds of London, 
founded in a London coffee house, was the first such large-scale business 
insurance program, and allowed individual investors to spread the risks of 
the British shipping industry as early as 1686.81   
The dispersion of shareholding and resulting offsetting of risk then 
encourages innovation and technological innovation, or the “technological 
project,”82 which is the life-blood of a market economy—for example, 
Apple planned on spending US$ 10 billion on research and development in 
2017.83  One can further see the American public’s wide-spread interest in 
innovation demonstrated simply by watching the popular U.S. reality TV 
show “Shark Tank” in which several professional investors consider the 
risks and potential rewards of investing in various small developers’ 
innovations. It is no accident that Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, 
Google, all dominant internet companies, were created in the United States. 
As Pejovich points out, a large body of literature shows that common law 
protects shareholders better than does civilian statutory law, and empirical 
evidence shows that the resulting dispersion of shareholding is much greater 
in the United States than in Western Europe (or Latin America), where large 
families, a few large shareholders, and financial institutions such as banks 
are primary shareholders. A major, well-documented study stated the 
following: 
We show that the origin of a country’s legal system proves to be the 
most important determinant of investment performance. Companies 
in countries with a legal system of English origin earn returns on 
investment that are at least as large as their costs of capital. 
 
 
association. Id. 
81 See Corporate History, LLOYDS.COM, https://www.lloyds.com/about-lloyds/history/corporate-
history (last visited Feb.12, 2018). See also Sara Palmer, Edward Lloyd, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).  The Royal Stock 
Exchange (now the London Stock Exchange) was founded earlier by financier Thomas Gresham, who 
patterned it after the Dutch stock exchange. Queen Elizabeth opened that exchange in 1571. See 
Heritage, THE ROYAL EXCHANGE, http://www.theroyalexchange.co.uk/heritage/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2018).  
82 CAPALDI & LLOYD, supra note 80 at 4–7 (discussing the technological project). 
83 Tim Bajarin, Why Apple Is Spending Crazy Amounts of Money on New Ideas, TIME (May 18, 
2016), time.com/4339940/apple-rd-research-development/. 
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Companies in all countries with civil-law systems earn on average 
returns on investment below their costs of capital. Furthermore, 
differences in investment performance that are related to a country’s 
legal system dominate differences that are related to ownership 
structure.84  
THE COMMON LAW AND BREXIT 
Some legal scholars ignore any distinction between common law and 
civil law or between the Rule of Law and Rechtsstaat,85 or they argue that 
Rechtsstaat has transcended the traditional “narrow” conception of the Rule 
of Law,86 or they argue that the distinction between common law and civil 
law is irrelevant to economic development.87 These conclusions are all 
challenged by the Brexit vote, where citizens of the UK voted to secede 
from the European Union. Under the European Union, life has become 
increasingly regulated by legislation issued by Brussels. The EU is “not 
merely an economic union” but is intended to “ensure social progress and 
seek the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their 
 
 
84 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance and the Returns 
on Investment, 47 J. L. & ECON. 589 (2004).  
85 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. Neither the World Justice Project nor the Index of 
Economic Freedom distinguish between the two. 
86 See Rainer Grote, The German Rechtsstaat in a Comparative Perspective, in THE LEGAL 
DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHTSSTAAT) 193, 197 (2014). See also 
Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 69 (1941) 
(“The individualistic philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries proceeded from the idea that the human 
individual was sovereign, i.e., of the highest value.  From this it was concluded that a social order can 
be binding on the individual only when it is recognized by the individual as binding.  From this came 
the doctrine of the social contract, which still has its exponents; but today the inclination is rather to 
a universalistic philosophy of values according to which the community is superior to the 
individual.”) (emphasis added). Hans Kelsen inspired post-WWII German constitutionalism, and while 
he here is discussing law in general, he had been educated in law in Germany, and was the most 
influential German jurist from the 1930s through post-WWII Germany. 
87 For examples of scholars who do not consider the distinction between common and civil law as 
predictive of economic development, see MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 79 at 21-25 (This work is 
discussed and critiqued in detail infra at text accompanying notes) (Note that in 2008, it was fashionable 
to see the U.S. financial crisis as predictive of a collapse of capitalism); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (explaining that 
Enron’s scandal was caused by people not doing what they were required to do under law in the first 
place, and arguing that the resulting legislation (the Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd Frank Acts) in both cases 
was counterproductive); and Nicholas Capaldi, Reclaiming the Narrative of Liberty in Corporate 
Governance, LAW & LIBERTY, (June 18, 2012), http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/reclaiming-
the-narrative-of-liberty-in-corporate-governance/ (reviewing STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Oxford U. Press 2012)) (describing the difference between 
Lockean and Rousseauean approaches to law and arguing that legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley that 
is passed in the heat of a perceived crisis subsequently turns out to be counterproductive). 
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people,”88 thus it has encompassed the continental conception of 
Rechtsstaat wherein government is conceived of as an enterprise 
association.89 EU legislation is proposed and drafted by the Commission 
(consisting of EU officials nominated by the Parliament, not elected) and 
then passed by the EU Council and Parliament. EU legislation comes in two 
forms:  directives and regulations.90  Directives order a member country or 
countries to develop and adopt legislation according to certain parameters. 
Regulations, once passed, are immediately effective without implementing 
legislation. 
Additionally, the treaties that founded the EU provide that a number of 
positive rights are guaranteed.  The European Union’s Guarantee of 
Freedom of Movement91 has enabled populations to move from areas of low 
employment to areas where they are more likely to find employment.  For 
example, unemployment among French youth in October 2017 was 21.9%, 
and has, for the period from 1983 to 2017 averaged 20.19%.92  Overall 
unemployment in the Eurozone averaged nearly 10% (above 9.9%) between 
2006 to 2016, reflecting weak economic growth,93 though it dropped to 
8.9% in September, 2017.94 Youth unemployment in the UK has averaged 
15.19% over the same period from 1983 to 2017, and was 12% in 
September, 2017.95  Overall unemployment in the UK was 4.3% in October, 
2017.96 The result of England’s comparatively lower unemployment 
statistics has been an increase in work-seeking immigrants: the net 
migration in 2017 was 250,000. – an increase from the previous year.97 The 
UK has a population of 63.7 million, of which 5.3 million (8%) are non-
 
 
88  DEFRENNE V SABENA (1976) CASE 43/75, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defrenne_v_Sabena_(No_2) (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).   
89 Discussed in greater detail infra at text accompanying notes 148-153. 
90 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Mar. 3, 
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/01) [hereinafter TFEU].  
91 Id. art. 45.  
92 France Youth Unemployment Rate, TRADINGECONOMICS, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/france/youth-unemployment-rate (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
93 Unemployment Rate in the European Union and the Euro Area from 2007 to 2017, 
STATISTA.COM, https://www.statista.com/statistics/267906/unemployment-rate-in-eu-and-euro-area/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
94 Unemployment Statistics, EUROSTAT STATISTICS EXPLAINED, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics (last visited Apr. 
15, 2018).  
95 UK Youth Unemployment Rate, TRADINGECONOMICS, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-
kingdom/youth-unemployment-rate (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
96 UK Unemployment Rate, TRADINGECONOMICS, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-
kingdom/unemployment-rate (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
97 Immigration to the UK: The Key Facts: Datablog: Facts Are Sacred, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jun/26/non-eu-immigration-uk-statistics. 
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British, and just over half of those - 2.9 million (5%) - are from Europe.98  
The Brexit vote surprised and even astonished people around the world 
who could not – and cannot – understand why citizens of the United 
Kingdom would vote to secede from the European Union.  If, however, one 
understands not just the current problems the British citizenry believe the 
E.U. has caused them, but also understands the historical cultural and legal 
disconnect between the U.K. and the continent, that decision becomes much 
more comprehensible.   
Prior to the vote, British philosopher Roger Scruton anticipated three 
possible reasons U.K. citizens might vote to separate the United Kingdom99 
from the European Union.100  His first reason was that the English have had 
a different attitude towards the European Union:  unlike the Continent, most 
of which had been occupied by the Nazis, the English had successfully 
defended their sovereignty and freedom, so their motives in joining the 
European Union were entirely different from those of Germany, France, and 
the other European states.101 Next, Scruton posited, that sense of sovereignty 
has been challenged by the European freedom of movement policy because 
English has become the world’s second language.102  A small country, 
England is now more densely populated than other European countries by 
the influx of a large number of immigrants per year, who are able to function 
because English is their second language, and who compete with the English 
for jobs and housing.103 Consequentially, Scruton theorized that many of 
those who would vote for Brexit believe that the European Union’s freedom 
of movement policy cost England its right to secure its own borders, and 
thus it was jeopardizing the island nation’s sovereignty and harming English 
citizens’ economic welfare and opportunities.104  
Scruton’s third explanation for a potential vote in favor of Brexit rested 
upon England’s unique legal system and its traditional understanding of the 
 
 
98 Reality Check:  How Many EU Nationals live in the UK?, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-uk-leaves-the-eu-36745584.  
99 The author understands that the terms United Kingdom, Great Britain, and England refer to 
different entities and begs the reader’s indulgence in using them interchangeably in this discussion.  Of 
the entities that comprise the United Kingdom, England and Wales voted for Brexit, while Scotland and 
Northern Ireland both voted to remain in the European Union. See Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: 
All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. 
100 Roger Scruton, Brexit: Yes or No?, YOUTUBE (Nov. 26, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bvlg8YK3iSU. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
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relationship between citizen and government.105 Scruton pointed out that 
Britain’s legal system was built up from below and is structurally 
completely different from other European nations.106 In Britain, individuals 
traditionally bring disputes to courts, and impartial judges then ‘discover’ 
the law (rather than create it).  Parliament may thereafter ratify such 
decisions, but usually does not.  This means that British law has two 
characteristics distinct from civil law systems:  law is based primarily on 
conflict resolution and built up from below by the accumulation of decisions 
made in individual disputes and is not typically based on legislation.107  
British judicial decision-based law might be more accurately described 
as conflict management rather than resolution:  the common law manages 
conflict, it cannot always fully resolve it. The common law historically 
recognized that the primary remedy a court can grant is money, and that it 
is not always an effective remedy (in which case, an equitable remedy may 
be granted).108 This is true of the U.S. as well, as recognized by James 
Madison in Federalist No. 10 where Madison effectively argued that 
government must work to manage conflict among interest groups because 
to attempt to eliminate them would destroy liberty and Madison further 
argued the structure of a compound republic (as opposed to a democracy) 
can effectuate this conflict management and provide the necessary 
stability.109 
Because of this difference in approach (conflict management versus 
legislation), Scruton posited that E.U.-imposed law inspires rebellion on the 
 
 
105 Id.  
106 Accord FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 84-85 (Routledge, 1982) 
(“England escaped a wholesale reception of the late Roman law and with it the conception of law as the 
creation of some ruler; . . .What prevented [the development of a highly centralized absolute monarchy] 
was the deeply entrenched tradition of a common law that was not conceived as the product of anyone’s 
will but rather as a barrier to all power, including that of the king . . . .” British eighteenth century 
freedom was not originally a product of the separation of powers, but rather a result of the fact that “the 
law that governed the decisions of the courts was the common law, a law existing independently of 
anyone’s will and at the same time binding upon and developed by the independent courts; a law with 
which parliament only rarely interfered . . . .”).   
107 Id. (“The only country that . . . built on the medieval ‘liberties’ the modern conception of liberty 
under the law was England.  This was partly due to the fact that England escaped a wholesale reception 
of the late Roman law . . . ; but it was probably due more to the circumstances that the common law 
jurists there developed conceptions somewhat [different from the Continent’s]. . . . What prevented [the 
development of a highly centralized absolute monarchy in England] was the deeply entrenched tradition 
of a common law that was not conceived as the product of anyone’s will but rather as a barrier to all 
power, including that of the king – a tradition which Edward Coke was to defend . . . . The freedom of 
the British . . . was thus not . . . originally a product of the separation of powers between legislative and 
executive, but rather a result of the fact that the law that governed the decisions of the courts was the 
common law, a law existing independently of anyone’s will and at the same time binding upon and 
developed by the independent courts; a law with which parliament only rarely interfered . . . .”) 
108 Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 535-536 (2016).  
109 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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part of the English who do not accept law that is imposed either from above 
or from outside their country.  Furthermore, legislators who draft European 
Union regulations do not understand the English legal system and only 
know how to regulate.110 
A major British polling company questioned 12,369 voters on the day of 
the referendum,111 and found that Scruton was largely correct in that the 
primary concern of those voting for Brexit was, first, their objection to EU 
legislation (Scruton’s third proposition) and, second, concerns about 
sovereignty/immigration/economics concern (Scruton’s second 
proposition).112 Nearly half (49%) of those voting to leave said the 
biggest single reason for wanting to leave the European Union was that 
they believed that legal decisions about the United Kingdom should be 
taken in the United Kingdom.113 A third of those voting to leave the EU 
indicated that their primary concern was immigration/economic 
opportunity.114  
As of this writing, slightly more than one year after the vote, the British 
government remains committed to Brexit:  more than eighty percent of 
voters backed one of the parties supporting withdrawal.115  Furthermore, 
Britain expects that its economy will remain strong post-withdrawal: 
The fundamentals of the U.K. economy are strong, providing a solid 
platform on which to build new trading links.  We have reduced the 
deficit by nearly 75% and cut taxes for millions of working people, 
and the unemployment rate remains low.  The U.K. was the second-
fastest-growing economy in the Group of Seven last year.  A 
Pricewaterhouse-Cooper’s report from February projects that Britain 
will hold the G-7 growth title until 2050, outstripping Germany, 
France, and Italy. 
The U.K. has long been one of the best places in the world to invest, 
with regulatory stability, a strong rule of law, and a low-tax, high-
skilled economy.116 
 
 
 
110 Scruton, supra note 100. 
111 Lord Ashcroft, How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday… and Why, 
LORDASHCROFTPOLLS.COM (June 24, 2016), http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-
kingdom-voted-and-why/.  
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Liam Fox, Opinion, Britain is Committed to Brexit & Free Trade, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/britain-is-committed-to-brexit-and-free-trade-1500845407.  
116 Id.  
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As scholars, all too often we refer to “the Western Tradition.” However, 
this is a scholarly fiction – there is no one Western legal or scholarly 
tradition. Britain and the rest of the United Kingdom have historically had 
a different understanding of how law should be created, as well as a different 
understanding of the relationship between man and government than does 
the civil-law-based Continent. As it has been described, the Anglo-
American [Rule of Law] is a sort of spontaneous growth so closely bound 
up with the life of a people that we can hardly treat it as a product of human 
will….”117  The civil law tradition is similarly connected with its history, 
which was entirely different. 
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND RECHTSSTAAT  
In contrast to David Hume118 and Adam Smith119 who viewed the 
Industrial Revolution positively, Jean Jacques Rousseau disliked the 
Industrial Revolution and rejected the Scottish Enlightenment’s emphasis 
on entrepreneurship, believing that it promoted individual greed and 
exploitation.120 To remedy the individualism that he perceived of as 
corrosive to the needs of the community, he developed the conception of 
the general will (volonté générale): governmental decisions should be based 
on what an average citizen would want if he knew what was best for all.121  
The French revolutionaries turned this into a credo of ‘Liberté, Egalité, and 
Fraternité,’ and had only a vague idea of the Reigne de Droit or L’État de 
Droit. The French Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) 
posited inalienable rights, but was not considered to be part of the 
 
 
117 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 116 (Liberty 
Fund, Inc., 8th ed. 2010). 
118 Tom Velk & A.R. Riggs, David Hume’s Practical Economics, 11 HUME STUDIES 154-165 
(Nov. 1985) (citing DAVID HUME, Of Commerce, in HUME’S WRITINGS ON ECONOMICS (Eugene 
Rotwan ed., Univ. Wis. Press 1955). Hume rejected “the idea that a nation can achieve greatness as an 
agricultural utopia.” Id. at 155.  He believed that “industrial development and the advancement of 
commerce were the springboards to progress and happiness.” Id. at156. And he held that “the apparent 
immorality of human greed and selfishness, combined with amoral curiosity and an urge to imitate, gives 
rise to the highly moral outcome of general progress in the arts, widely distributed wealth, economic 
progress, and an increase in liberty.” Id. at 156.  
119 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(Liberty Fund ed.1981) (photographic reproduction of Oxford Univ. Press 1976).  Using the example of 
a pin factory (now immortalized on the British twenty-pound note), Smith developed the concept of the 
division of labor brought about by industrialization and expounded on how rational self-interest, 
individual autonomy, and competition can lead to diversification of the market, the use of money to 
facilitate trade, and economic prosperity. Id. at 13-30. 
120 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes 
[Discourse on the origin and foundation of inequality among men] (1754). 
121 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique [The Social Contract 
or Principles of Political Right] (1762). 
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Constitution (any of the 5 of them), and was therefore regarded as 
unenforceable.122 The Germanic conception of a Rechtsstaat then picked up 
where the French left off. Eighteenth century Austrian philosopher 
Immanuel Kant is generally identified as the spiritual father of 
Rechtsstaat.123  He defined it as the union of a multitude of men under laws 
of justice with any lawful state necessarily being a state governed by the law 
of reason based on and protecting freedom for every member of society, 
equality, and individual autonomy:124 
“There is only one innate right,” says Kant, “Freedom (independence 
from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist 
with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” 
(6:237). Kant rejects any other basis for the state, in particular 
arguing that the welfare of citizens cannot be the basis of state power. 
He argues that a state cannot legitimately impose any particular 
conception of happiness upon its citizens (8:290–91). To do so would 
be for the ruler to treat citizens as children, assuming that they are 
unable to understand what is truly useful or harmful to themselves.125   
 
 
122 RAYMOND CARRÉ DE MALBERG, CONTRIBUTION À LA THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DE L'ETAT 228-243 
(2004). Carré de Malberg posited that the state was an entity that could act only through law, and could, 
through the concept of self-limitation, bind itself to its own norms. His theory was that law exists to 
protect individual rights, and such rights are only partially protected by legislated law. Ultimately, Carré 
de Malberg, along with other French positivist jurists of his time, maintained that without specific 
appendage to the Constitution, the 1789 Declaration could have no legal effect. Id. at 493-500.  In 
contrast, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, a similarly pre-constitutional statement of rights not 
referenced in the U.S. Constitution was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court 212 times by 2011. Nadia E. 
Nedzel, Chapter 18:  The Rule of Law v. Legal State: Where Have We Come From, Where Are We Going 
To?, 38 IUS GENTIUM 289, 295 (2014).  
123 Grote, supra note 86, at 193-94. But see FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE POLITICAL IDEA OF THE RULE 
OF LAW 18-27 (Univ. Chi. 1955) (the Cairo Lectures), in which Hayek discusses those German writers 
who developed the theoretical conception of the Rechtsstaat after 1800.  The Rechtsstaat was designed 
primarily to curb the arbitrary exercise of power by the expanding bureaucracy. All of continental 
Europe had developed centralized administrative machinery whose professional administrators had 
acquired primary power. The two possible ways of limiting that power was to either rely on ordinary 
courts to decide which administrative acts were lawful and consistent with private liberty; or in line with 
French practice, establish quasi-judicial bodies within the administrative machinery.  Rudolf von Gneist 
called for the creation of a separate system of courts for administrative actions, arguing that ordinary 
judges could not be expected to possess the specialized knowledge required.  Thereafter, Rechtsstaat 
came to refer to a system of independent administrative courts to police the government, and make sure 
it was following its own law, rather than a reliance on ordinary courts.  EUGENE F. MILLER, HAYEK’S 
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: AN ACCOUNT OF ITS ARGUMENT 118-119 (IEA Pub. 2010).  Even 
under this interpretation; however, Rechtsstaat is not designed to protect individuals, but is intended to 
insure the smooth and uniform operation of government. 
124 Kant’s Social & Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 24, 
2007, substantially revised on Sept.1, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/. 
125 Id.   
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Rechtsstaat morphed several times after Kant. It gradually became more 
focused on equality and the government’s duty to balance positive rights 
against a citizen’s obligations towards society, thus absorbing Rousseau’s 
conception of the general will. By the mid nineteenth-century, in place of 
Kant's negative rights, Von Mohl promoted freedom through the state. 126 
The lawful state was to measure governmental action against the general 
objective of promoting an individual's complete development.127 It was at 
that point that Rechtsstaat became premised on ‘positive rights'.  This 
contrasts with the Common law concept that the proper role of government 
is to prevent interference with liberty and that individuals are in charge of 
their own development, and it is consistent with the conception of a 
government as an enterprise association whose goal is to give rights to 
individuals and promote their complete development – as with the European 
Union’s stated goals. 
Jeremy Bentham, the English legal philosopher, lived from 1748-1862, 
and thus was active during both the American and French revolutions. In 
1776, he wrote and published a pamphlet highly critical of Blackstone, a 
pamphlet still referred to as the beginning of English legal reform.128 While 
ultimately influential in England as well, during his lifetime, Bentham’s 
philosophy of law was closer to the French Encyclopedists than to any 
English school of writers:  in fact, because of his correspondence with them, 
various leaders of the French Revolution so respected his views that they 
declared Bentham to be an honorary citizen of France in 1792.129 
As a young man, Bentham believed wholeheartedly “in that form of 
utilitarianism which places the object of life in the proportion of the 
‘greatest happiness of the greatest number.’”130  He believed that European 
legal institutions needed reforming, and that legislation was the key to those 
reforms.131 He further believed that legislation was a science, and that 
because England’s law had grown haphazardly from an accumulation of 
judicial decisions, it was antiquated, unscientific, and separate from 
 
 
126 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 319 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).  
127 Id. 
128 Charles Noble Gregory, Bentham and the Codifiers, 13 HARV. L. REV. 344, 344 (1900). 
129 See RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM) xvii-xix, 291 n. 1 
(Philip Schofield, Catherine Pease-Watkin, & Cyprian Blamires eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2002) 
(detailing his interaction with various French philosophes). 
130 A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 95 (Richard Vande Wetering ed., Liberty Fund 2008).  The title of 
Dicey’s lecture is tellingly entitled Period of Benthamism or Individualism – Bentham thought he was 
fighting for individual liberty and laissez-faire. Id. at 106-107. 
131 Id. at 96.  
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morality.132 He argued that legislation deals with whole classes of men, 
while morality deals with individuals, and the State’s function is to promote 
the happiness or well-being of a large number of persons, not to conjecture 
about what may constitute the happiness of an individual.133 Thus, Bentham 
is regarded as the founder of legal positivism.134  He also planted the seeds 
of the codification movement – codification being the hallmark of civil 
law:   
Law, like tinned roast beef, he thought susceptible of export without 
deterioration and fit for consumption in any clime. “Laws need not 
be of the wild and spontaneous growth of the country to which they 
are given,” he wrote; “prejudice and the blindest custom must be 
humored, but they need not be the sole arbiters and guides.” 
“Legislators, who, having freed themselves from the shackles of 
authority, have learned to soar above the mists of prejudice, know as 
well how to make laws for one country as for another,” — though he 
admits they required some data as to the circumstances of those for 
whom they deal.135 
Bentham vigorously urged that all countries replace their existing laws 
with complete code of laws, clear, simple, shaped on the principle of utility, 
and all comprehensive.136 Bentham furthermore offered his services as 
codifier to many different countries, including the governors of the colonies 
of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New Hampshire, and subsequently President 
Madison.137 However, his arguments for codification had the most profound 
 
 
132 LOUGHLIN, supra note 126 at 320. 
133 Id. 
134 Legal Positivism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 3, 2003), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. 
135 Gregory, supra note 128 at 345. 
136 Id. at 349. 
137 The only U.S. state that fully adopted the codification movement was Louisiana, which enacted 
its Civil Code on March 31, 1808, and its adoption was conceived and developed in accordance with 
public pressure, not pursuant to any suggestions by Bentham.  See John T. Hood, Jr., The History & 
Development of the Louisiana Civil Code, 19 LA. L. REV 18 (1958). While patterned after Napoleon’s 
Draft Projet of 1804, Louisiana’s first Civil Code was grounded in indigenous Spanish and French law. 
Id. See also LOUIS MOREAU LISLET & JAMES BROWN, LOUISIANA, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW 
IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO ITS 
PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (New Orleans, 1808) (tracking articles of the Projet and tying them 
to Spanish & French sources).  Bentham and New York jurist Edward Livingston maintained a lengthy 
correspondence, and when Livingston was appointed by Thomas Jefferson to resolve Louisiana’s 
concerns about maintaining indigenous law after the Louisiana Purchase, Livingston appointed attorneys 
Louis Moreau Lislet and James Brown to write Louisiana’s first civil code, using Napoleon’s Projet as 
a pattern. See Jeremy Bentham, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/.  Louisiana’s Civil Code was thereafter updated several 
times, and is now consistently updated by the Louisiana State Law Institute.  As such, it has since 
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influence on Emperor Napoleon’s post-Revolutionary France, and from 
there to the rest of what is now the civil law world:  
[T]he “Code Napoleon,” or as it is called under the Republic, “Code 
Civil,” [was] promulgated under the authority of the great Emperor 
between the years 1804 and 1810, and designed to replace the 
extreme confusion of the “droit ecrit et droit coutume” of France, 
where Voltaire had said, with bitter truth, that a traveler had to change 
laws as often as horses.138 
Savigny complained of the ignorance and haste with which it was 
completed, and Austin follows him and points out its defects in 
definition, but it has continued to dominate France long after the 
imperial house has fallen, and, having been imposed by conquest or 
its equivalent, has been adopted and retained in Italy, Holland, 
Belgium, the Rhenish Provinces, Poland, and Switzerland, and been 
a model for other countries as Greece. Napoleon's boast, “I shall go 
down to posterity with my code in my hand,” has been justified. 
Bentham with just pride pointed out in a letter to the Emperor of 
Russia that he alone of living men was quoted in the introduction to 
this code, and his name and doctrines were familiar and powerful 
in France long before this great work was accomplished.139 
The civilian legislative state was conceived of as a juristic person and 
the only rights individuals have are those created through legislation.140  
 
 
incorporated concepts developed by U.S. Common law and commercial law as well as keeping many of 
its original civilian concepts.  The author has had the honor of working with the LSLI’s Committee on 
Lesion Beyond Moiety in 2016-2018.  See generally Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection 
and the Spanish Perception:  Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on 
Louisiana’s Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067 (2003). 
138 At the time, while Justinian’s Code (i.e. the Roman Digest) and Catholic Canon law provided 
some law used in all parts of France and most of the Continent, each separate area of France had its own 
written ‘coutume’ or customary law, the most comprehensive of which was the Coutume de Paris –these 
sources were subsumed into and replaced by Napoleon’s Projet.  See JEAN-LOUIS HALPERIN, LE CODE 
CIVIL, (Dalloz 2d ed. 2003) & Le Code Civil ou Code Napoléon: Contexte de la Codification de 1804-
2004, REALISATIONS, http://www.thucydide.com/realisations/comprendre/code_napoleon/code3.htm. 
Le Code Civil reprenait des solutions déjà dégagées par la doctrine et la jurisprudence civile de 
l’Ancien Régime et mettait en œuvre les maximes juridiques de la Révolution. Les législateurs 
s’étaient inspirés à la fois du droit romain, des anciennes coutumes de France, des ordonnances 
des rois et des lois formulées par les grandes assemblées de la Révolution.  
[The Civil Code replaced the solutions previously developed by doctrine and jurisprudence of 
the Ancien Regime and put in place juridical maxims of the Revolution.  The legislators were 
influenced by Roman law, the old customary law of France, the king’s ordinances, and the laws 
formulated by the great assemblies of the Revolution] (trans. Author).  
139 Gregory, supra note 128, at 353. 
140 LOUGHLIN, supra note 126.  
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Morality is an internal matter, while law is external and should be measured 
by its utility.141 This understanding of the relationship between the state and 
law, as identified by Von Jhering, differs from the common law 
understanding of a limited government: because there is no power above the 
state, the state must limit itself.142 Nineteenth Century Rechtsstaat regarded 
government both as the representative of the general will and as having its 
own particular will based on the government’s subjective right to command 
in accordance with legislated law.143 Thus, it was a way to establish the 
legitimacy and authority of government, not a way to establish rights. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and through the early part of 
the twentieth, the term Rechtsstaat became so malleable that it was at times 
regarded as a magic box from which a jurist could obtain any legal principle 
or claim that was desired. Some jurists did not hesitate to describe Hitler’s 
Third Reich as an exemplary positivistic updated version of Rechtsstaat: the 
implication was hence that if a Rechtsstaat is defined as a state based on 
order, then because Hitler’s Third Reich was a legal order, it was thus a 
Rechtsstaat.144  
Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen reclaimed Rechtsstaat 
somewhat in the twentieth century by incorporating it into his Pure Theory 
of Law. He asserted that the state was not power but law; and the legal 
system must be hierarchical, with a Grundnorm (such as a constitution) at 
the top.145 His influence is seen in legal systems, such as those of post-
World War II Germany and France, which place the constitution as the 
foundational document with separate constitutional courts having sole 
 
 
141 DICEY, supra note 130, at 97-98. 
142 LOUGHLIN, supra note 126 at 320.  It is no accident that Rechtsstaat theorizers posit that there 
is no power above the state – the Roman Digest (i.e. Justinian’s Code) posited that the Emperor IS the 
law, and Civilian theorists have inherited the belief that government pre-exists the law, in contrast with 
common law history from the 11th Century that posited that the King must obey the law.  
143 Id.  
144 See Pietro Costa, The Rule of Law: A Historical Introduction, in THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, 
THEORY AND CRITICISM (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo, ed., Springer 2007) 123-125 (Describing how two 
jurists, Otto Koellreutter and Carl Schmitt both strived for a pre-eminent position in Hitler’s regime, that 
Koellreutter attempted to argue that the Nazi order was still a Rechtsstaat because general laws and 
judicial independence were still independent, though individualism was not, and how Schmitt thought 
the new principles were an improvement on Rechtsstaat), citing C. Schmitt, Nationalsozialismus und 
Rechtstaat, in JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 716 (1934), and O. KOELLREUTTER,  GRUNDRISS DER 
ALLEGEMEINEN STAATSLEHRE, 108-108, 255-6 (Tübingen: Mohr 1933). See also HAYEK, supra note 9, 
at 112-20) (discussing how Rechtsstaat came to be perversely interpreted by the Nazis, and how that 
interpretation was accepted by other countries). 
145 H. KELSEN, HAUPTPROLEME DER STAATSRECHTSLEHRE (1984). See also Aalen: Scientia-Verla 
& H. Kelsen, Staat und Recht, in SOZIOLOGISCHE HEFTE 18-27 (1922) and H. 
KELSEN, RECHTSSTAAT UND STAATSRECHT 36 (1913). 
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responsibility over constitutional disputes.146 After World War II, shock at 
the horrors wrought by the Nazi party led Germany, Continental Europe, 
and the Western world in general to reject the extreme positivist view that 
law is separate from morality and wholly the sovereign’s command.147 
Germany transformed Rechtsstaat “from a merely formal concept focusing 
on organizational and procedural safeguards into a concept based on a 
substantive ideal of justice:”148  
Art. 20, para. 1 of the Basic Law explicitly commits the legislative 
and other authorities of the Federal Republic to the goal of social 
justice, although it leaves the political bodies a wide discretion in the 
determination of the economic and social policies which are required 
to achieve this goal. This constitutes a major shift away from a 
narrow concept of liberty [i.e. the common law concept] which 
focuses on the right of individuals to be left alone by the 
government to a broader notion of individual freedom that takes 
into account the economic and social conditions in which this 
liberty thrives and recognizes a legitimate role for the state in 
promoting the welfare of its citizens by providing vital public 
services in areas like education, health, housing and transportation. 
Art. 1, para. 1 of the Basic Law establishes the respect for, and the 
protection of, the dignity of man as the guiding principle of all state 
action.149 (emphasis added) 
Incorporated into modern Rechtsstaat is the abstract concept of human 
dignity: “The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority.”150 Art. 1, para. 1 of the Basic Law 
stipulates that the respect for, and the protection of, the dignity of man as 
the guiding principle of all state action.151 While the government must 
guarantee and nourish a person’s individuality and dignity, this 
guarantee is tempered by the sense of solidarity and responsibility owed 
by the individual to society: A person is not to be ‘“an isolated and self-
regarding individual,’ but related to and bound by the community.”152 
 
 
146 See Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
247, 255-256 (2001) (discussing the history of constitutional courts and Kelsen’s influence on post-war 
governmental theory). 
147 Grote, supra note 86, at 196. 
148 Id. at 197.  
149 Id. 
150 Edward J. Eberle, The German Idea of Freedom, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 2, 12-13 (2008) (quoting 
Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law). 
151 Id. at 197. 
152 Id. at 13.  
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Thus, rather than protecting an individual’s liberty from interference, the 
German government has a duty to teach concepts such as “social solidarity,” 
and to enforce specific, listed freedoms. Though the government provides 
and “guarantees” freedom to individuals, it does so only to a certain extent 
–individuals must still bow to the general will or “community.” This 
relationship between man and government, originally described by Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, can thus be accurately described as “Rousseauean”153 
Consequently, Rechtsstaat is founded on the theory that the government 
gives freedom to individuals who in turn have duties to the community – 
there is no such thing as freedom without responsibility.  It is a theoretical 
construct, and tasks government with providing education, health care, 
housing, and other benefits as protection for an individual’s “dignity,” and 
it has evolved into a constitutional principle controlling state activities.154 It 
includes fundamental organizational principles such as the separation of 
powers, judicial review by the German Constitutional Court 
(the Bundesvervassungsgericht), and the principles of legality, fair 
procedure, legal certainty, and the principle of proportionality.155 There 
remains a tension between formal liberal protections of the Rechtsstaat and 
the social/instrumentalist values implicit in the Sozialstaat or “social state.” 
As a result, some modern jurists interpret Rechtsstaat in highly politicized 
ways, while others jettison it altogether.156  
THE RULE OF LAW & ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
Continental European scholars, “notwithstanding their wisdom, their 
learning, and their admiration for the British political system, from the times 
of Montesquieu and Voltaire” have misunderstood the proper meaning of 
the British constitution.157 Max Weber stated that while England had 
achieved capitalistic supremacy, it was not because but rather in spite of its 
judicial system.158 In saying this, Weber acknowledged that England’s legal 
system was different from that of the continent’s civilian tradition, but while 
there was some connection between that difference and England’s 
“capitalistic” supremacy, he could not see the connection and instead saw 
 
 
153 See generally CAPALDI & LLOYD, supra note 80. 
154 Eberle, supra note 150, at 1, 3-6, 16-17, 22-24, and 30-31 (describing how the concept of 
dignity under the German Basic Law has led to various positive rights). 
155 Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the 
European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 244-245 (2010). 
156 LOUGHLIN, supra note 126 at 321.  
157 BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 71 (Institute for Humane Studies, Inc., 1972). 
158 WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 814.  
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England’s legal system as anachronistic and “deviant.”159 
Weber was wrong. England’s economic success (and the traditional 
economic success of other common law jurisdictions like the U.S, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia)160 was because of those 
differences, not in spite of them. The Rule of Law differs from Rechtsstaat 
and the unique characteristics of the English people, the English legal 
system, and the history of its development are what support both liberty and 
the market economy, which developed symbiotically and spontaneously 
with the Rule of Law. 
THE RULE OF LAW DIFFERS FROM RECHTSSTAAT 
In the Road to Serfdom, Hayek cautioned that the modern (civilian) focus 
on legislation, bureaucratization, and regulation leads inevitably to loss of 
both liberty and economic vigor.  In The Mystery of Capital and The Other 
Path, Hernando de Soto proved the latter. Too much regulation leads to rent-
seeking and corruption of government as businesses inevitably devote more 
time and resources to working around the regulations, and it leads to 
inefficiency when businesses become so stymied by regulations that they 
function outside the law rather than within it.161  
Hayek’s definition of the English Rule of Law can be reduced to two 
prongs:  1. The consent of the governed to obey the law, and 2. Limited 
government. The effects of Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law differ in several 
respects: (1) the Anglo-American tradition emphasizes civil association, not 
enterprise association as the proper relationship between man and 
government; (2) the Rule of Law protects individual property rights, not 
redistribution; (3) the concept of a civil association reflects a culture more 
hospitable to entrepreneurship;  and (4) the Anglo-American tradition 
supports security of transaction and encourages commerce, but through 
means other than legislation.  It does not hold that law can be reduced to a 
 
 
159 Id.  
160 See STEVE PEJOVICH & ENRICO COLOMBATTO, LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE:  THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW (2008) (explaining that economic development in 
common law countries is even stronger than indicated in such studies such as the Index of Economic 
freedom); 2017 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, https://www.heritage.org/index/ (last visited Dec. 29, 
2017) (listing the top 10 most economically free countries as Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Australia, Estonia, Canada, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, and Chile). 
161 See e.g., THE OTHER PATH, supra note 14 at 153 (an overly burdensome business registration 
regime forces informal businesses to face costs of avoiding penalties for operating without permits, 
paying taxes, or applying for legal authorization, it costs them business because they cannot advertise), 
155 (informals make a number of unreciprocated transfers to formals, which represent net losses to 
informals), and 157 (informals may not pay direct taxes or comply with labor laws, but this also means 
they cannot use any but low technology which causes low productivity). See also Key Concepts, supra 
note 50. 
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logical system supervised solely by a single constitutional court, and it does 
not regard rights as given by the state. The two concepts indicate an 
underlying difference in how one should think about law.  
Under Bentham’s influence and regarding law as a rational science with 
a hidden structure that can be uncovered, European civilians at one time 
believed, “almost as an article of faith,’ that a single, complete, coherent, 
and logical system of law to govern all legal relationships is possible and 
that the human mind is capable of thinking it out.”162 Consistent with 
Bentham’s thought, the Napoleonic authors of the original French Civil 
Code believed that by replacing all pre-existing laws, their Code (because 
of its rational content) could govern the legal affairs of all nations at all 
times. 163 Furthermore, because of its universality, it would enable the broad 
government control and authoritarianism clearly stated at the onset of the 
revolutionary legal efforts.164 In keeping with a focus on teleology and 
deductive logic (principles derived from their original Greek-influenced 
Roman law), civilians such as Jhering reasoned that since life is governed 
by purpose, the science of collective life (i.e. law) should be deductively 
organized and primarily employ a teleological method.165 In contrast, the 
common law mind regards law as empirical and pragmatic as much as 
rational; thus, common law reasoning is as much inductive as it is deductive 
and it does not support the concept of a definitive and final statement of the 
law or a definitive final arbiter of the law.166  
 
 
 
 
162 Woodfin L. Butte, Stare Decisis, Doctrine and Jurisprudence in Mexico and Elsewhere, in THE 
ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 311, 315 
(Joseph Dainow ed., 1974). 
163 Dante Figueroa, Twenty-One Theses on the Legal Legacy of the French Revolution in Latin 
America, 39 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L., 39, 87 (2010-2011). 
164 Id. “Thus, the pretense of universality, broad government control, and state authoritarianism 
were clearly stated at the very onset of the [French] revolutionary legal efforts.” 
165 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 
140-41 (1911-1912). 
166 See Jordan T. Cash, The Court and the Old Dominion: Judicial Review Among the Virginia 
Jeffersonians, 35 LAW & HIST. REV. 351 (2017) (concluding that Virginian founders disagreed on 
whether the U.S. Supreme Court would be the final arbiter in disputes between states and the new federal 
government). Nothing in the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of what is 
constitutional.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) announced that “the federal judiciary is supreme 
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution” and further that an “interpretation of [the Constitution] 
enunciated by th[e] Court . . . is the supreme law of the land.” However, while the other two branches 
defer to Supreme Court decisions, they also challenge that premise on occasion. See e.g., Miranda & its 
progeny.  
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RULE OF LAW AND THE LOCKEAN NARRATIVE 
First described by A.V. Dicey, the English Rule of Law grew from 
centuries of custom, Anglo-Saxon culture, and practice – not theory, and 
not political science. The freedom to be let alone is not a “narrow” concept 
of liberty, it is in fact much broader than Rechtsstaat, and is premised on an 
entirely different relationship between man and government.167  Under the 
Rule of Law, law is supreme over government and governmental powers 
are limited. This concept has been traced back to Tacitus’s writings about 
limitations on Anglo-Saxon kings’ power.168 Government’s narrow role is 
to protect the polity from invasion, protect property rights, and protect 
individuals from unjustified intrusions into their liberty: “The end of law is, 
not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom . . . where 
there is no law there is no freedom.  For liberty is to be free from restraint 
and violence from others . . . .”169  Society is regarded as being composed 
of individuals, and it is individuals that are important, not communities, and 
not factions.170 In contrast to the Rousseauean Narrative,171 this Anglo-
American view of the relationship between man and government has been 
described as the “Lockean Narrative.”172 It is the spontaneous development 
of this relationship that led to England’s protection of individuals and its 
economic success because it allowed individuals to pursue their own 
interests and consistently forced limits on governmental power.  
Further substantiation is found in the history of the common law itself. 
For purposes of this article, the focus of the following historical discussion 
will be on those attributes of common law that have fostered individualism 
and economic development. This of necessity precludes discussion of much 
that led to these developments, including the effects of the Norman 
 
 
167 Nedzel, supra note 122; RECHTSSTAAT, in THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND 
THE LEGAL STATE (Rechtsstaat), (James R. Silkenat, et al., eds., Springer 2014). 
168 GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 199 (Holt & Co. 1950); SHARON 
TURNER, THE HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-SAXONS (2007) (1802). 
169 See CAPALDI & LLOYD, supra note 80 at 9-11 (discussing John Locke’s theory of limited 
government & quoting Locke’s Second Treatise). 
170 See id. at 12-14 (discussing the culture of personal autonomy and its importance in the Lockean 
narrative (i.e. British tradition). See also OAKESHOTT, supra note 26 at 36-46 (discussing characteristics 
of being a ‘free agent’). 
171 See CAPALDI & LLOYD, supra note 80 at 18-23 (describing the Rousseauean narrative as 
considering the privatization of property as the source of all evil, the resulting market economy as 
leading to inequality and conflict, the individual’s obligation to voluntarily submit to the authority of a 
“General Will” (the ultimate right, or what we would all agree to will if we all really knew and 
understood the fundamental truths about the human condition), and law that must reflect the General 
Will and be a fresh product of legislation). 
172 See generally id. at 2-14 (describing the Lockean Narrative as being focused on liberty and 
requiring the technological project, a market economy premised on economic liberty, limited 
government and political liberty, the Rule of Law, and a culture of personal autonomy or individualism). 
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invasion, Henry II’s foundation of the common law and jury system, and 
the consistent trend towards limitation of governmental power. 173 
ENGLISH PROPERTY OWNERSHIP, TRANSFERS, INHERITANCE, AND 
INDIVIDUALISM  
Continental feudal economies operated on a system of scutage, where 
freemen would agree to serve in a lord’s army for a certain number of days 
in exchange for protection – or alternatively pay someone to serve in the 
army instead. Serfs, the lowest class of feudal society, were bound to the 
land. They were required to work the lord’s land, mines, forests, or roads in 
order to be allowed to occupy a plot of the lord’s land and receive his 
protection.  While they did not own the land on which they worked, its use 
was heritable.  Other peasants or cottagers might own their land.  The central 
feature of traditional East European serfdom or peasantry, which lasted 
longest and was studied in detail in the early twentieth century, is that 
ownership was not individualized.174 No single individual owned the 
productive resources exclusively, they belonged instead to the household: 
Land property was essentially familial; the individual was its temporary 
manager. Thus, “the individual held no ultimate and exclusive property 
rights . . . and the group dominated the individual in terms of ownership.”175   
Production in peasant society, apart from that paid in rent, was almost 
wholly for direct consumption, not for sale or exchange in the market.176 A 
peasant family might buy and sell a small piece of land to even out 
demographic differences in households or in times of crisis, but there were 
no extensive or open markets in land.177 This led to a patriarchal society: 
because subordinate family members lacked geographic mobility, 
alternative occupations, or private property, the acting head of the 
household maintained significant power and control over his wife and 
children.  
In contrast with the Continental practices described previously, 
historians generally agree that the strong link between the family group and 
the land had disappeared in England by or soon after the Black Death of the 
Fourteenth Century.178 Visitors to rural England as early as the thirteenth 
 
 
173 A more thorough history of both the English and Civilian legal systems will be included in a 
book I am writing on this topic. 
174 MACFARLANE, supra note 17, at 18. 
175 Id. at 20. 
176 Id. at 21. 
177 Id. at 23. 
178 Id. at 100. 
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century were surprised at the comparative wealth of the English, their 
freedom and social mobility,  and their individualistic (even arrogant) 
attitudes.179 Certainly, empirical studies of property records and disputes 
show that by the sixteenth century, and likely earlier, English peasant 
society was much more mobile and hence significantly different from the 
classic model of continental Europe. Cambridge University anthropologist 
and historian Alan Macfarlane’s study of English tenant lists in the 
seventeenth century showed that many children left home in their early or 
middle teens. 180  For example, he matched baptismal records against parish 
registers, and of twenty male children baptized in one church between 1660 
and 1669 and not listed as having been buried, only six remained listed as 
registered in the parish in 1695.181  
Macfarlane’s examination of wills and court records showed further that 
land changed ownership frequently, and thus families did not keep 
ownership of it for several generations.   Literary evidence similarly 
indicated that extended families did not remain in the same household, as 
was the case in typical feudal societies: young couples were expected to live 
disciplined, self-governing, independent lives in their own separate 
household.182 Macfarlane concluded that England did not exhibit peasant 
culture and was individualistic very early on:  sons were not tied to their 
father’s land holding; people were geographically mobile; labor was hired; 
individuals practiced saving and thrift, married at a later age, and young 
adult women moved away from the area.183 Even as early as the thirteenth 
century, land sales in England were frequent, and individuals - not collective 
groups - bought and sold land.184  Thus, there was little notion of the sanctity 
 
 
179 Id. at 130-164 (citing and quoting work of other historians, especially George C. Homans, 
English Villagers of the 13th Century (Norton 1941), 164-188 (relating the impressions of Continental 
writers), 166-168 (relating the mid-19th century impressions of de Toqueville with regards to the English 
peoples’ wealth, absence of social barriers, individualism), 168-170 (relating Montesquieu’s early 18th 
century notation of English liberty, independence, individualism, and individual property ownership), 
170 (relating Frederick, Duke of Wirtemberg’s late 16th century impression of English agricultural 
wealth, arrogance, and lack of subservience), 171 (relating Emmanuel van Meteren’s mid-16th century 
impression of England’s high standard of living and individualism); 176-177 (relating Sir Thomas 
Smith’s mid-16th century perception of England’s free men, contract-based society, and easy social 
mobility); 173 (relating Andrea Trevisano’s early 16th century perception of English arrogance and self-
confidence and also noting England’s meritocratic society and that trade and wealth were widely 
distributed within the country), 179-83 (relating Sir John Fortesque’s late 15th century notation of 
England’s egalitarian and wealthy society which Fortesque attributed to “a combination of natural 
fertility, limited monarchy, and Common Law”), and 183 (relating Bartholomaeus Anglicus’ mid-13th 
century description of England which stressed its relative wealth and liberty). 
180 Id. at 73-74. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 75. 
183 Id. at 78. 
184 Id. at 118. 
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of a family holding in England, as owners sold land to both outsiders and 
children. 
English inheritance laws also differed from those on the Continent: there 
was no expectation that a child would inherit from his or her parents. In 
France, to this day, a parent cannot disinherit his children beyond his 
disposable portion – all children have a claim to some share in their parents’ 
property.185 But under English Common Law, children had no birthright and 
could be left penniless. As early as the thirteenth century, a landowner had 
a perfect right to disappoint his expectant heirs by transferring all of his land 
to someone else before death, and could disinherit them in his will.186 “The 
Statute Quia Emptores of 1290 stated that ‘from henceforth it shall be lawful 
for every freeman to sell at his own pleasure his land and tenements’”187 – 
and this was well before the Black Death hit England in 1348-1349. It also 
shows that in this respect, English common law was entirely different from 
Continental law, where landowners could not alienate land without the 
consent of their expectant heirs.188 
Alienation rights were no different when English tenants did not own 
land straightforwardly in “fee simple.” By the early seventeenth century, 
1/3 of all English land was held by copyhold tenures – “at the will of the 
lord” – meaning in theory that at a person’s death, his heirs had no 
security.189  In the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, of a total of 517 
land transfers in one area, only 74 were inheritance-related, while 443 were 
sales.190  Even if the lord owned the land, he could not stop his tenants from 
exchanging land as they wished, provided that tenant had fulfilled the duties 
required on that particular land.191 But gradually over time, there was no 
rigid division between free peasant owners in fee simple and those who were 
holders.192  Thus, by the latter part of the thirteenth century, there were 
innumerable licenses to alienate land, sub-leases, short-term leases, and 
 
 
185 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 912-913 (Fr.). For an example of a similar policy 
adopted by a U.S. state, which also shares French heritage, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493-1495 
(2003). Note though that Louisiana’s forced heirship is limited to children under 23 or those over 23 
who are disabled. France recently provided an exception, allowing foreigners who own property in 
France to avoid its forced heirship rules, though the forced heirship laws still otherwise apply to French 
nationals. 
186 MACFARLANE, supra note 17, at 82.  
187 Id. at 83 (citing A. W. B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 51 
(1961)). 
188 Id. (quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 309, 313 (2d ed., Cambridge 1968)). 
189 MACFARLANE, supra note 17, at 106-07. 
190 Id. at 124. 
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 104. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
484 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:447 
 
 
 
frequent sales indicating a considerable land market in both copyhold and 
freehold properties.193 
English jurist Henry de Bracton (1210-1268) provided clear justification 
for why the British inheritance laws were so flexible, showing that as early 
as the thirteenth century, long before the Black Death, Britain did not have 
a peasant society, but was already focused on individual achievement and 
practical insight into human behavior:194  
[A] citizen could scarcely be found who would undertake a great 
enterprise in his lifetime if, at his death, he was compelled against his 
will to leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant children and 
undeserving wives. Thus, it is very necessary that freedom of action 
be given him in this respect, for thereby he will curb misconduct, 
encourage virtue, and put in the way of both wives and children an 
occasion for good behavior, which indeed might not come about if 
they knew without doubt that they would obtain a certain share 
irrespective of the testators wishes. 
By the sixteenth and seventeenth century, English private property rights 
were highly developed, which led to an enormous amount of litigation in 
the courts of equity, as well as the making of “a very large number of wills 
dealing with chattels and real estate”. Neither of these things happened 
among traditional Continental peasant cultures where no one person had 
strong property rights.195 It also was directly connected to the comparative 
wealth of English peasants, noted by a number of 14-16th century writers.196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 Id. at 125. 
194 Id. at 103. 
195 Id. at 93. 
196 Id. at 51. 
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FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT197 AND THE ROYAL COURTS  
The royal courts founded originally by Henry II in the twelfth century 
gradually became the preferred forum for all private disputes.198 Five causes 
of this popularity include 1) the jury, which was preferred to older modes 
of trial such as trial by combat; 2) the professional skill of royal judges 
which was superior to that of biased feudal lords and manorial bailiffs; 3) 
the incontestable validity of royal records, which was preferable to the 
fallible memories and poorly-kept records of local courts; 4) the fact that 
the goal of the royal courts was to maintain the King’s Peace – they were 
not trying to improve or perfect humanity –; and 5) their decisions were 
enforced by an authority with wealth and power of such a magnitude that it 
could not be challenged by any English subject.199  
As discussed previously, Feudal economies typically operated on a 
system of scutage, where one would agree to serve in a lord’s army for a 
certain number of days in exchange for protection (or pay someone to serve 
in your stead).  During this same period, guilds arose among craftsmen 
primarily in towns:  drawn together into one street or quarter by a similar 
trade or occupation (e.g. tanners by a river, dockers by a port), they 
combined to make their own rules and were widespread throughout northern 
Europe.200 Their zenith occurred in the thirteenth century.201 The English 
 
 
197 See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) (arguing that individuals in the ancient world were 
tightly bound by status to traditional groups, while in the modern one, they are free to make contracts 
and form associations with whomever they choose because they are viewed as autonomous agents).  The 
history of Oakeshott’s distinction between civil and enterprise associations (i.e. in Maine’s terms, 
individual as opposed to status) can be traced back to Hobbes, and the civilian rejection of civil 
association is reflected in the scholarly discussion of the two concepts.  After Maine’s work, in 1887, 
Ferdinand Tönneis, in GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (generally translated as 
COMMUNITY & CIVIL SOCIETY), recognized the distinction as dating back to the 17th Century British 
Philosopher Thomas Hobbes, and argued against Gesellschaft (i.e. individualistic society, or Oakeshott’s 
civil association).  The book sparked a revival of corporatist thinking, including the rise of neo-
medievalism, the rise of support for guild socialism, and caused major changes in the field of sociology. 
PETER F. KLARÉN & THOMAS J. BOSSERT, PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES OF CHANGE IN LATIN 
AMERICA 221 (Westview Press 1986). Thus, this line of legal philosophy/sociology further demonstrates 
the underlying individualism of English culture as opposed to the civilian’s focus on community. 
198 See generally MACFARLANE, supra note 17, at 37-72 and FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS 
C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 36 (Elibron Classics 2005) (1915) (discussing 
Henry II). 
199 HOGUE, supra note 15, AT 19.  
200 GEORGES RENARD, GUILDS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 2 (Dorothy Terry trans., Augustus M. Kelley 
1968) (1918). 
201 Guild, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/guild-trade-
association ((last visited Dec. 31, 2017) (“By the 13th century, merchant guilds in western Europe 
comprised the wealthiest and most influential citizens in many towns and cities, and, as many urban 
localities became self-governing in the 12th and 13th centuries, the guilds came to dominate their town 
councils. The guilds were thus able to pass legislative measures regulating all economic activity in many 
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Guild system never reached anything like the power or importance that it 
attained in Flanders, Italy, or Germany.202 As mercantilism and nation states 
developed and replaced feudalism, the guild system gradually lost power 
everywhere in Europe.203 
Under the guild system, when merchants had disputes, mercantile courts 
resolved them with flexible informality. By the sixteenth century, with the 
rise of the Tudors and the British naval power, instead of merely producing 
wool, England was engaging in the production of wool into fabric to be sold 
abroad, and it was this conversion from a feudal to a mercantile and money-
based economy204 that drove the development of the common law of 
contracts as the Royal courts expanded to encompass the increasingly 
profitable field of private commercial litigation.205  Over time, the English 
common Law courts and admiralty courts gained power over commercial 
conflicts while merchant courts lost.206 On examining the historical context, 
it becomes apparent that it was the growth of the markets, manufactured 
goods, and a money-based economy that drove the creation of the common 
law of contract.207 The development of the common law of contract and the 
 
 
towns.”). 
202 G. D. H. Cole, Introduction, in GUILDS IN THE MIDDLE AGES, at xiii (Dorothy Terry trans., 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1968) (1918). 
203 See Guild, supra note 201 (“Guilds helped build up the economic organization of Europe, 
enlarging the base of traders, craftsmen, merchants, artisans, and bankers that Europe needed to make 
the transition from feudalism to embryonic capitalism. Yet the guilds’ exclusivity, conservatism, 
monopolistic practices, and selective entrance policies eventually began to erode their economic utility.” 
(emphasis added)).  
204 See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC THOUGHT BEFORE ADAM SMITH: AN AUSTRIAN 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 221-226 (1995) (describing how technological 
changes in the wool industry revolutionized rural England). 
205 KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 
(Greenwood Press 1990) (ebook) (“Before the Tudor period mercantile cases were not often heard in 
the common law courts, but by then the staple courts were in decay and common law judges like Coke 
began actively competing with the remaining mercantile courts for the expanding commercial 
business.”).  See also ROTHBARD, supra note 204 at 283-84 (discussing Sir Edward Coke’s interest in 
acquiring jurisdiction over some contracts and limiting the King’s monopoly powers).  
206 William Searle Holdsworth, The Development of the Law Merchant and its Courts, in SELECT 
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY VOL. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907). In 
many medieval jurisdictions, merchants had special courts separate from the rest of the community, 
belonging to the merchant guild, and often excluding foreign merchants from trade.  The English 
government started limiting their power to exclude foreign merchants as early as 1303 and, as 
international seagoing trade increased in importance, first admiralty courts and then common law courts 
took over jurisdiction concerning both local and international trade. Although craft guild control over 
trade was formally abolished in England in 1835, internal trade had ceased to be ruled by special guild 
courts as early as the 16th century.  In England, companies of merchants and craft guilds possessed no 
jurisdiction of their own and were governed by the common law.  In contrast, in France, Italy, and 
Germany, merchants had separate law and separate courts which they themselves administered. 
207 See TEEVEN, supra note 205 (“The success of the mercantile courts was a part of the reason 
that the competitive King’s Bench allowed the action of Assumpsit to grow during the sixteenth century 
in order to claim some of the expanding commercial business for itself”). 
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resultant growth of judicial protection for private, individual enterprise is an 
interesting story  
With Henry II’s foundation of the common law system, the only way an 
individual could bring a lawsuit in the court of Common Pleas was if he 
obtained a writ. An original writ was “a mandatory letter issuing from the 
court of chancery under the great seal, and in the king’s name, directed to 
the sheriff of the county where the injury was alleged to have occurred, 
containing a summary statement of the cause of complaint, and requiring 
the sheriff in most cases to command the defendant to satisfy the claim or 
else appear in court to account for not satisfying it.”208 If the individual’s 
complaint did not fit one of the pre-established writs, if he was even able to 
bring a claim under equity, the process was much slower.  
The initial kinds of cases heard in Henry II’s courts were limited to 
property ownership and crimes.209 By the middle of the thirteenth century, 
the number of writs (the filed document that established a lawsuit) had 
expanded to encompass new kinds of actions.210 The British barons were 
angered by this expansion of the royal courts’ jurisdiction because it eroded 
their own judicial power.211 Consequently, in 1258, an early Parliament of 
barons forced Henry III to sign the Provisions of Oxford which limited the 
number and kind of writs that could be issued in exchange for giving him 
financial support.212 Furthermore, by the time of his son, Edward I’s reign, 
the King’s courts could hear only actions over forty shillings.213  From the 
time of the Provisions of Oxford, any growth of the royal courts had to be 
within the existing writ system; if there was no writ, then there was no right 
to pursue action in a royal court.214  Consequently, most informal 
contractual promises (i.e. promises not formalized under seal) could only be 
heard in local courts.215  Before 1602 A.D., one could pursue a contract 
action only where one had a covenant under seal or under a writ of debt 
(debitatus assumpsit) where the complaining party had performed and the 
other party had breached, there was no remedy for executory contracts or 
 
 
208 Original Writ, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
209 See Michael David Knowles, Henry II, King of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-II-king-of-England (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (discussing 
the Assize of Clarendon and possessory assizes). 
210 TEEVEN, supra note 205, loc. 122 (ebook). 
211 Id. loc.125. 
212 Id.  
213 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I 553-54 (2d ed. Cambridge 1909).  
214  TEEVEN, supra note 205, loc. 125 (ebook).     
215 See Id. loc. 123  (stating that entry to the royal court could only be gained with a writ issued by 
the Chancellor). 
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other money and credit-based exchanges,216 which were becoming common 
as early as the mid fourteenth century. 217  
The royal courts became popular with plaintiffs because their processes 
were consistent, their enforcement of judgments was stringent, the courts 
avoided the corruption and internal politics of local (barons’) courts, and the 
defendant (in addition to facing a possible fine) could be forced to go to 
Westminster to defend himself.218  Thus, plaintiffs put pressure on the royal 
court system to recognize “informal” contractual promises by falsely 
claiming a crime had been committed. 219  
By the fifteenth century, feudalism was in serious decline all over 
Europe, and nation-states’ interest in international trade and mercantilism 
was rising.220 Consequently, as countries focused on obtaining access to 
commodities, shipping became increasingly important, and nation-states, 
including England, focused on restricting access to their ports from 
competing nations.221 The increased supply of silver that resulted from 
England’s foreign trade meant that prices skyrocketed six-fold during the 
Tudor Century, creating a new merchant class based on the sale of wool 
abroad and causing land to be further commercialized because it was needed 
for the grazing of the sheep that provided the wool.222  This also meant that 
there were many disputes involving transactions of more than forty 
shillings.223  This further increased the desirability of the King’s courts in 
plaintiffs’ eyes, and their enforcement of contract law further weakened the 
English guild system.  The reasons the King’s Bench and Common Pleas 
would find it desirable to recognize such informal promises were several, 
and probably included economic interests such as court fees as well as 
sargents’-at-law and barristers’ fees, and intellectual competition between 
Common Plea courts (who normally represented the status quo) and the 
 
 
216 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 14, at 634-645. 
217 TEEVEN supra note 205, loc. 249 (ebook) (“By the mid-fourteenth century, there was a growing 
realization that the common law personal actions of Covenant and Debt were ineffective remedies for 
the money-credit economy beginning to replace feudalism”). 
218 Id. at loc. 299-303.  
219 Id. at loc. 303-310. (describing how plaintiffs, keen on royal jurisdiction, found that royal courts 
would accept contractual wrongs if a fictitious crime (contra pacem and vi et armis) was alleged, for 
example they would claim that a surgeon committed battery (rather than malpractice), or a smithy killed 
the plaintiff’s horse with force and arms).  
220 Laura LaHaye, Mercantilism, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html (last visited Apr, 15, 2018).  
221 Id.  
222 TEEVEN, supra note 205, loc. 487 (ebook). 
223 See id. loc. 796 (relating that another reason for increased use of Common Please in connection 
with contract claims was the fact that due to the fall in value of money, the 40 shilling rule had been 
forcing everyday agreements, formerly heard in the local courts, into the royal courts.”). 
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King’s Bench (which was the activist court ready to change archaic Debt 
rules).224 
By the sixteenth century, wool producers and merchants wanted their 
informal promises to be enforced.  Prior to a money-based economy, there 
had been no pressing need for remedies for informal transactions, and courts 
were more oriented to hearing cases based on property disputes.225 In Slade 
v. Morley (1602), however, a joint decision between the Court of Common 
Pleas and the King’s Bench, the royal courts created remedies for wool 
producers and merchants who were parties to “informal” (i.e. unsealed) 
contracts.226 The case involved an executory contract between a farmer who 
sold his crops and a buyer who failed to pay in advance as promised.227 The 
court eventually held, in favor of the plaintiff farmer, that a promise might 
be implicit.  It also allowed Slade to demand expectation damages, the value 
of performance and future profits.228 The case was a watershed in contract 
law development, recognizing informal promises and the rising merchant 
class,229 and acting as a bridge between medieval and modern law. Thus, 
contrary to Weber’s theory that English courts were a drag on the 
development of a merchant class, history shows that their recognition of 
informal promises further enabled its development because merchants and 
prospective merchants could rely on the assumption that a royal court would 
enforce contractual promises.   
Once courts recognized informal executory promises, the floodgates of 
litigation were opened. The preexisting doctrine of consideration -- only 
bargained-for exchanges were serious enough to be enforced by a court -- 
helped courts eliminate some litigation involving informal promises.230 
However,  courts --and especially Parliament -- then became concerned that 
juries might believe unscrupulous plaintiffs asserting executory promises 
based solely on oral testimony.231 This concern led to the creation of the 
Statute of Frauds, which limited certain kinds of cases involving hard-to-
prove or valuable claims.232 Thus, in 1677, Parliament required certain kinds 
 
 
224 Id. loc. 799-806. 
225 Id. loc. 513. 
226 Id. loc. 803. 
227 Id. loc. 808. 
228 Id.  
229 Id.  
230 See id. loc. 688-692 (discussing the origin of the doctrine of consideration in the fifteenth 
century and its acceptance by Common Pleas after Slade’s Case); id. loc. 408 (ebook) (once Slade’s case 
allowed the writ of assumpsit to include executory contracts, assumpsit and its required consideration 
supplanted both Covenant and Debt).  
231 Id. loc. 1499-1506.  
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of contracts to be written rather than oral in form.233 Once the writing 
requirement of the Statute of Frauds was in place, disputes arose concerning 
the requirements for a document to constitute a writing. These disputes led 
to the development of the parole evidence rule, which states that, if there is 
a writing, then neither oral nor other extraneous evidence should be allowed 
to negate or vary the contents of the writing.234 
Thus, the change from feudalism to mercantilism to capitalism drove the 
development of common law of contract as tradesmen demanded more 
consistent remedies for broken promises and the courts found it profitable 
to hear them. Over time, the British royal courts considered increasingly 
complex contractual and financial issues, including the collectability of 
interest in a country increasingly dependent on the availability of credit.  
In response to the growing importance of the banking and insurance 
industries, the Glorious Revolution (which stabilized the British 
government), the industrial revolution, and buttressed by courts that 
supported commerce and contracts, between 1689 and 1789, England 
became the most dynamic capitalist economy in the world.235 By 1624, 
Coke (off the bench and now in Parliament), believing that free trade was 
beneficial to the nation state, drafted the Statute of Monopolies that curbed 
the king’s power to grant monopolies.236 William and Mary were installed 
to the Crown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.237  The subsequent 
commercial upsurge meant stability, and the barons of Parliament, inspired 
by the successes of the Dutch republic, demanded support for trade and 
industry, as demonstrated in part by their passage of both the Statute of 
 
 
233 Id. loc. 1483.  
234 Id. loc.1505-1509.  
235 See WILLIAM D. RUBINSTEIN, CAPITALISM, CULTURE, AND DECLINE IN BRITAIN: 1750-1990 1-
2 (Routledge 1993) (describing Britain as the preeminent industrial and manufacturing power of the 
eighteenth century, but explaining that Britain’s decline began when it started to reject free-market 
economics).  See also Becoming American: The British Atlantic Colonies 1690-1763, NATIONAL 
HUMANITIES CENTER, 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/becomingamer/economies/text1/text1read.htm (last visited Apr. 
15, 2018) (“With the Glorious Revolution, the 1707 union of England and Scotland, and victory in the 
intercolonial wars (creating a massive national debt), the “United Kingdom of Great Britain” became a 
first-class power.  Militarily, its navy dominated the seas.  Economically, its banks and financiers 
replaced the Dutch as the source of capital working money.  Commerce became the “soul of the kingdom 
. . . .”).  
236 Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Liebowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution:  A History of 
Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 998-999 (2013).  See also id. at 992 (Coke’s report 
on Darcy v. Allen as early as 1602 describes the common law court’s rationale as a “strong statement 
about the importance of open and free trade.  It states that the court struck down the royal monopoly 
because allowing people to work in their respective trades was not only beneficial for them, but was also 
necessary for the well-being of the whole country.”).  
237 Kevin L. Teeven, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 35, 58-59 (1994). 
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Monopolies and the Statute of Frauds.238 By the mid eighteenth century, 
Lockean views of unrestricted property rights and faith in reason led to 
changes in commercial law needed by the burgeoning economy, and 
common law courts became the exclusive forum for adjudication of 
commercial transactions239 England was the first nation to industrialize, and 
became the greatest trading nation of the eighteenth century. Though 
whether its power came more through industrialization or through trade and 
banking innovations is now being questioned by historians.240 These 
developments were accompanied and supported by its legal system, which 
supported freedom of contract, free transfer of property, limited 
government, and a culture focused on individualism – in other words, the 
Rule of Law.  
LAW AND CAPITALISM 
Law professors Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, who share a 
mutual interest in the role of law in economic development, wanted to 
explore the relation between legal institutions and market-oriented 
economic institutions, and decided to do so by combining theoretical and 
empirical studies of the topic with “in-depth analyses of contemporary 
events in countries in different stages of economic development.” 241 After 
a short discussion of Weber and Hayek, they characterize what they term 
the prevailing argument for common law being more supportive of a market 
economy as insufficient in light of the rapid growth of the Asian Tigers at 
the end of the twentieth century.242   
Milhaupt and Pistor take issue with what they term the Hayekian 
description, arguing that it has been taken for granted in economics, 
literature, and policy discussions, which encourages countries to 
(wrongfully) re-create features of the United States legal system thought to 
account in some way for the comparative robustness of U.S. economic 
institutions.243  They describe the ‘prevailing’ view as a simple argument 
that law fosters economic activity (exclusively) by protecting property 
rights, and that a legal system that clearly allocates and protects property 
rights (i.e. one that has adopted the Rule of Law) precedes economic 
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development and is a precondition to economic success.244  “Once such a 
system is in place, it constitutes a fixed and politically neutral institutional 
endowment – an unchanging foundation for economic activity.”245 
Furthermore, Milhaupt and Pistor argue that this view “depicts law as a kind 
of technology that can be inserted in the proper places – and imported from 
abroad when necessary – to accomplish an important task. . . ‘[T]he fullest 
achievement [of the rule-of-law ideal] is associated with the maturation of 
capitalism into laissez-faire competition under conditions of political 
stability.’”246  
Based largely on their analysis of how six different legal systems dealt 
with scandals involving large, publicly-traded companies,247 Milhaupt and 
Pistor conclude that the ‘Hayekian’ view of the Anglo-American Rule of 
Law rests on a number of inaccurate assumptions: (1) that Law is an 
unchanging precursor of a market system instead of there being an highly 
iterative relationship between law and markets, and (2) that the distinction 
between civil and common law is not a good predictor of whether a 
country’s economy is likely to be successful.248 From their analysis of the 
six  corporate crises along with a summary examination of data on rate or 
economic growth in the twentieth century,249 they conclude that there is no 
single “Rule of Law” that leads to real-world economic success, and that 
instead focus should be put on (1) the organization (centralization or 
decentralization) of the legal system, (2) the function that law plays in 
support of a market activity, and (3) the political economy for law 
production and enforcement.250   
Milhaupt and Pistor state that they are sensitive to the limitations of their 
analysis, and do not claim to have definitive answers to the questions they 
have raised.251  While I disagree with many of their conclusions and their 
factors, some of their insights are intriguing and consistent with my thesis.  
With regard to the first factor that they find indicative of economic success, 
i.e. the organization of the legal system of a particular nation, Milhaupt and 
Pistor distinguish between centralized systems that vest law-making powers 
in the legislative branch, and which prefer centralized law enforcement 
 
 
244 Id. at 18. 
245 Id. at 4. 
246 Id. at 5.  
247 The scandals studied by Milhaupt and Pistor included the U.S. Enron Scandal (id. at 47-67), 
Germany’s Mannesmann Executive Compensation Trial (id. 69-86); Japan’s Livedoor Bid and Hostile 
Takeovers (id. 87-107); Korea’s SK Episode (id. 109-124), China’s Aviation Oil Episode (id. 125-148), 
and Russia’s re-nationalization of Yukos (id. at 149-169).  
248 Id. at 4. 
249 Id. at 23-24. 
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251 Id. at 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2018]     INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT     493 
 
 
 
 
mechanisms (i.e. bureaucratic enforcement) over private litigation and 
decentralized systems that allocate law-making and enforcement activities 
to multiple agents.252 The latter systems, they argue, are more adaptive but 
far more complex, and thus less predictable and less able to engineer foster 
broader social change.253 Because most civil law countries would be 
characterized as ‘centralized,’ and most common law countries would be 
regarded as ‘decentralized’, contrary to their assertions, Milhaupt and 
Pistor’s view does not rebut the common law/civil law traditional 
dichotomy.  Their study never defines Rule of Law or economic 
development with great precision, nor does it reflect an in-depth, long-term 
study of legal history, legal anthropology, or economics, or a deep 
understanding of Hayek’s and similar scholars’ analyses.  Their statement 
about engineering social change indicates their presumption that a 
government’s duty includes engineering social change – a position that is 
part of the civilian tradition, but antithetical to traditional common law as 
described by Hayek and Oakeshott.  
The second factor that Milhaupt and Pistor find determinative of 
economic development is “the function that law plays in support of a market 
activity.” They posit that law can perform multiple functions in support of 
market-oriented economic activity and that the protection of property rights 
– which they claim is the exclusive focus of the prevailing view  – is only 
one possible function.254 They argue that in some legal systems the 
protective function is dominant, but in others residual rights of control are 
allocated to multiple agents, forcing them to bargain over legal outcomes.255 
As such, in these systems, the law performs a coordinating function rather 
than a protective one.256 Centralized systems tend to be coordinating, 
whereas decentralize systems tend to be protective.257 In addition to its 
coordinating or protective roles, Milhaupt and Pistor find that law may also 
be used to lend credibility to government policies, enhancing their 
effectiveness.258  
To the extent that Milhaupt and Pistor assert that law and government 
must be studied in context with the society in which it has developed, I agree 
completely –this is one of the main reasons for a multidisciplinary approach.  
However, this ‘factor’ is not in any way predictive of which kind of law or 
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kind of government is most supportive of economic development. 
Furthermore, to the extent that they imply that economic growth is 
independent of a legal system or that a legal system in and of itself cannot 
or does not predicate economic development, I would again agree. 
Consistent with Hayek, Oakeshott, and Tamanaha, instrumental law is 
likely to be ineffective or lead to unintended consequences, whether it is 
intended to break down class structure (as in the French Revolution) or 
prevent corrupt accounting (Sarbanes Oxley).   
When Milhaupt and Pistor refer to ‘coordinating’ functions, they seem 
to be referring to the political process through which some of the corporate 
scandals studied were resolved.  For example, in Korea’s SK Scandal, a 
foreign investor (Dubai-based Sovereign Global) tried to purchase SK 
Corporation, Korea’s largest chaebol, which had suffered massive losses 
due to its executives’ undisclosed investments in derivatives, 
mismanagement, and fraud.259 Nevertheless, Sovereign Global was 
squeezed out under Korean corporate law by SK’s controlling shareholder 
families through a tangled web of share ownership, which created enormous 
potential for exploitation of minority investors or “shareholder 
tunneling.”260  That squeeze-out was affirmed by Seoul’s High Court.261 In 
that case, Korean law was used by the actors to coordinate and secure their 
positions – this is the opposite of the common law conception of the Rule 
of Law.  Korea subsequently chose to retool its corporate law more in line 
with U.S. investor protection, though its investor protection still remains 
“somewhat underdeveloped.262   
Similarly, Putin rather blatantly used Russian tax and bankruptcy law to 
“renationalize” Yukos, Russia’s most successful oil company, which had 
begun to pay dividends to its shareholders, used American accounting 
standards to report its financial status, and was hailed as the best-governed 
and most transparent Russian firm.263  As they describe it “law was not used 
to constrain those in power, to create and protect rights, or to provide 
outsiders with access to economic and political markets.”264  As in Korea, 
the law was used by those in power to retain or expand their power – this is 
the opposite of what (under any definition) constitutes the Rule of Law.  It 
can only homologate the economic power of those already in power, it does 
not democratize economic development.  
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260 Id. at 114-115. 
261 Id. at 113.  
262 Id. at 123.  
263 Id. at 149-165.  
264 Id. at 165.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2018]     INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT     495 
 
 
 
 
In contrast with what happened in Korea and Russia, as Milhaupt and 
Pistor relate, Singapore used its tough securities laws to force China to 
discipline Chinese executives who (like the Korean Chaebol family) had 
mismanaged CAO, an oil company traded on the Singaporean stock 
exchange but controlled by a mainland Chinese holding company with close 
ties to the state.265 Faced with bankruptcy and looking for a bailout after 
CAO sustained massive losses from speculating in oil, Chen Jiulin, CAO’s 
managing director, forged documents in a scheme to defraud Deutsche Bank 
and violated Singaporean insider trading laws.266 Singaporean authorities 
investigated, and its regulators and criminal enforcement agents moved 
swiftly against some of CAO’s executives (Chen served four years in 
Chinese prison, a Singaporean court required three others to pay substantial 
fines).267 Milhaupt and Pistor conclude that in order to be allowed to list its 
companies, the Chinese government was willing to play by Singapore’s 
rules to a certain extent.268 Nevertheless, they downplay the depiction of 
Singapore as an emerging common-law country with strong investor 
protection and effective financial regulation, stating that individual 
investors have only limited ability to enforce their rights in court, and 
Singapore relies heavily on centralized administrative mechanisms other 
than law because the resolution of the CAO crisis depended on the 
intervention and support of a Singaporean governmental entity, Temesek.269  
Milhaupt and Pistor’s “coordinating function” analysis is somewhat 
confusing both in that it does not address any connection between law and 
economic development, and in that it mixes together two very different 
concepts about how societies work.  In the Korea and Russia examples, law 
was used by powerful entities with the specific aim of homologating their 
power.  This is the very opposite of what is generally contemplated as the 
Rule of Law, under which law applies equally to everyone and is intended 
to limit power.  In contrast, Singapore applied its law.  The fact that a 
government entity, Temesek, may have helped negotiate a settlement 
between two sovereign governments in a tricky diplomatic situation does 
not negate that fact, nor does it indicate that Singapore is not patterning itself 
after common law countries:  one of governmental agencies’ traditional 
functions is to negotiate solutions to disputes, whether in common law or 
civil law jurisdictions. 
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As their final criteria concerning the relationship between law and 
economy, Milhaupt and Pistor question what they perceive as the prevailing 
view that legal systems that are conducive to economic activity are 
politically neutral:  they argue that this claim is false because “[l]aw, a 
product of human interaction, obviously does not function independently of 
the political system.”270  Furthermore, Milhaupt and Pistor argue that “the 
political economy determines whether law is contestable” – where Milhaupt 
and Pistor define “contestable” as “the extent to which law is subject to a 
process of creative destruction by the participation of private, social, and 
governmental actors as opposed to being exclusively an instrument of 
political actors . . . .”271 The first statement, that law cannot be politically 
neutral, like their earlier implication that law should be used to engineer 
social change, is consistent with the civilian Rechtsstaat view of the 
relationship between the individual and government: that the purpose of 
government is to change society, and that law is the instrument by which it 
does this.  It is inconsistent with the traditional common law concept that 
law should be (as Oakeshott describes) adverbial.  In other words, law 
should set the rules by which we play the game – whether that game is 
cricket or selling securities on a stock market – but it should not stipulate 
who actually will win the game.  In other words, that law should be 
politically neutral.   
In contrast with the first statement, the second – that concerning the 
‘process of creative destruction’ – Milhaupt and Pistor touch on an 
important concept.  As de Soto and Hayek point out, good law (i.e. 
functional law) is a formalization of existing habit, and while those habits 
are originally developed by private and social actors, they are eventually 
formalized by the government by means of the political process.   
While Milhaupt and Pistor’s study is certainly very interesting, and it is 
accurate in that they find that law is not separable from the culture in which 
it develops;272 nevertheless, (as they themselves acknowledge) their analysis 
is limited.273  To begin with, they reject Hayek’s description of the 
relationship between the Rule of Law and economic development without 
an in-depth understanding of it.  Their list of references includes the Road 
to Serfdom and the first volume of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, and they 
refer to Hayek’s spontaneous order, but their work contains little discussion 
of Hayek’s thoughts and none on Fuller, Oakeshott, or the empirical studies 
of economists de Soto or Pejovich who have addressed the topic directly.   
 
 
270 Id. at 7. 
271 Id. 
272 See id. at 210-211. 
273 See supra discussion at text accompanying note 242. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2018]     INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT     497 
 
 
 
 
Milhaupt and Pistor never define the Rule of Law or discuss it in its 
cultural context, but instead refer to it as if it is merely a synonym for legal 
positivism instead of a particular kind of relationship between citizen and 
government. Their conclusion that different legal systems may use the same 
legal concepts very differently is entirely correct – comparative lawyers 
have consistently noted that legal transplants are often ineffective or used in 
ways not intended – but Milhaupt and Pistor do not analyze whether the 
different uses can or do lead to greater economic growth.  Instead, as all six 
of the countries considered in their study are large economies, their 
underlying conclusion is quite obvious: different countries deal with legal 
issues and scandals that involve large companies differently.  Their 
argument would have been stronger had they considered the history of how 
these economies grew and whether legal changes helped or hampered that 
growth. Furthermore, though their book begins with some statistical data 
concerning growth in GDP during the twentieth century, because the major 
portion of the book is devoted to their “Institutional Autopsies” (the study 
of the six corporate scandals), the reader is necessarily left with the 
impression that the authors assume the mere presence of large corporations 
is part and parcel of a country’s economic development, when, in fact, large 
companies typically account for fifty percent or less of a country’s economy 
and a much smaller percentage of its businesses.274 They also ignored the 
history of economic development.   
The question is not whether a country can develop economically over a 
short period of time (as have the Asian Tigers), but whether it can maintain 
that development over a very period of time longer than a mere portion of 
one century.  A simple study of the history of English property and contract 
law in context with its economic growth provides insight into why and how 
England became the first capitalist powerhouse.  History further shows that 
common law countries that have adopted the common law conception of the 
Rule of Law, like the United States, Canada, Australia, and the UK, 
demonstrate sustained, long-term growth that is supported by innovation 
and entrepreneurship. Professor Pejovich used data developed by complex 
studies of the Rule of Law and economic freedom to show that this is still 
the case, and Hayek’s and de Soto’s studies explain why and how civilian 
bureaucracy-based systems tend to stifle economic growth. 
 
 
 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 62-70. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are two different conceptions of the Rule of Law: the original 
Anglo-American conception identified by A.V. Dicey and further explained 
by Friedrich Hayek and Michael Oakeshott, and the Continental conception. 
It is the former concept, which developed out of the Anglo-American legal 
tradition, that more strongly supports consistent, long-term economic 
development, though it is not the only necessary institution.  In addition to 
the Rule of Law, a society must have a market economy, the technological 
project (a culture that values innovation and entrepreneurship), and a culture 
of autonomy in order to achieve consistent economic development.275 
(Notice that democracy is NOT included as a requirement – but that is a 
discussion for another article (or book)).  
Milhaupt and Pistor ostensibly reject the distinction between common 
law and civil law and also reject any notion of a necessary relationship 
between the Rule of Law and economic development,276 due to a thin 
understanding of the cultural differences of the two traditions or 
‘narratives.’ They focus instead on centralized versus decentralized 
systems, the protective versus coordinating function of law, and power 
struggles among elites (“political economy”),  though they ultimately 
conclude that most countries that are developing economically have moved 
to incorporate law that is more protective of property and contractual rights 
(and patterned after U.S. law).277 Comparative legal scholars agree that legal 
transplants generally do not work, and Milhaupt are correct in concluding 
that such adopted law is generally interpreted differently, due to cultural 
differences.278 Because the scope of their study was necessarily small, 
Milhaupt and Pistor did not see any instances where a country (other than 
the United States) recently developed its own law to address a perceived 
problem or institutional weakness.279 A case in contrast, however, is Chile, 
which has successfully designed and implemented new criminal, labor, and 
family courts based on models of its own design which incorporate elements 
of both common law and civil law.280 
 
 
 
275 CAPALDI & LLOYD, supra note 80 at 4–14 (discussing the importance of the technological 
project, a market economy, and limited government to a strong economy).  
276 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 79. 
277 See id. at 192-93. 
278 Id. at 103, 175.  
279 Id. at 207. 
280 See Nedzel, supra note 18, at 99-108 (this article and the sources cited therein describe how 
Chile designed and implemented changes in its criminal court system and contrasts Chile’s successes in 
that effort with Venezuela’s failures in maintaining an independent judiciary). 
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Sadly, the dominant American legal philosophy since the mid-twentieth 
century is that developed by Dworkin and Rawls, both of whom argue that 
the grundnorm underlying law in the Western tradition is equality, not 
limited government, and not equality in application of the law.281 Legal 
positivism has become widely accepted in both civil and common-law 
countries, and with it, ever-increasing legislation and bureaucracy. Because 
positivism and the civilian Rechtsstaat encourages governmental 
instrumentalism and increased regulation, they discourage the 
entrepreneurship necessary for economic development.  As Hayek 
discussed in Road to Serfdom and Hernando de Soto demonstrated in The 
Mystery of Capital, over-regulation stifles individual entrepreneurship and 
hence a country’s economic development. It is the accumulation of the 
efforts of small entrepreneurs that creates sustained growth, not primarily 
the growth of large entities. The effect of increased regulation between 2008 
and 2017 (i.e. Sarbanes Oxley) has been a decrease in the growth of small 
enterprises and the lower status given to the United States 282in the Index of 
Economic Freedom.283  
Perhaps because of an effort to be seen as diplomatic, comparative legal 
scholars typically avoid stating that one system is more effective than 
another.  Nevertheless, if some characteristics are more effective than 
others, stating that factual truth may enable positive change, while such 
misplaced diplomacy disables it.  Furthermore, as lawyers, we tend to 
conceptualize solutions to problems in terms of legislation and regulation. 
Analogously, the person with a hammer sees everything as a nail; surgeons 
think all medical issues require surgery, etc. However, in order to 
understand the interaction between the Rule of Law and economic 
development and develop more effective solutions, we as lawyers must 
learn to look at the role of law in its cultural context, including other 
disciplines such as philosophy, history, and, of course, economics. And we 
 
 
281 See e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, xii (Harvard University Press 1978). 
(describing Dworkin’s and Rawls’s theory of legislative rights that the most fundamental of all rights is 
a distinct conception of the right to equality, which Dworkin calls the “right to equal concern and 
respect”); Id. at 150 (describing Rawls’s A Theory of Justice as showing that if men and women are 
rational, they will choose his two principles of justice which provide that every person must have the 
largest political liberty compatible with a like liberty for all, and that “inequalities in power, wealth, 
income, and other resources must not exist except in so far as they work to the absolute benefit of the 
worst-off members of society.”) 
282 See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87 (discussing the counterproductive effects of 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
283 Compare the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2008), 
https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2008/index2008_executivesummary.pdf (ranking the United States 
as #5) to the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2017), 
https://www.heritage.org/index/ (ranking the United States as #17).  
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must recognize that the proper role of law is to manage conflict. 
Instrumental law is likely to be not merely ineffective, but even 
destructive.284 
A society based on consent among equals of necessity recognizes 
individuals rather than classifying people based solely on their social status. 
The individualism of English culture was demonstrated first in its property 
and inheritance habits and laws, and then in its development of contract law. 
Though the Rule of Law had not yet been named as such, it was already 
central to a seventeenth or eighteenth-century Englishman’s expectations of 
his government. The English cultural focus on the individual as the ‘unit’ of 
society – rather than any conception of the general will – allowed England 
and her progeny to become economic powerhouses.  The Rule of Law -- as 
opposed to Rechtsstaat -- encourages entrepreneurship and individual 
investment on a massive scale while it discourages governmental corruption 
and politicization of the law.  
Hayek thought that some of the strength of common law lay in its deeply 
entrenched tradition that was “not conceived as the product of anyone’s will 
but rather as a barrier to all power, including that of the king.”285 He further 
posited that some of its effectiveness was due to its emphasis on inductive 
thought and practical problem solving, in order to preserve peace.286  His 
positing that the most effective law grows spontaneously out of practice is 
illustrated by de Soto’s study of the history of property law in the United 
States.287  Treating law and legal institutions deductively, Hayek argues, is 
destructive of liberty and false in both factual and normative conclusions 
because social institutions --including legal systems -- can never be entirely 
the product of design.288 Such theories restrict the utilization of available 
knowledge and they are false because they conceive of the human mind as 
being able to stand outside of itself. As most comparative lawyers point out, 
and as Milhaupt and Pistor themselves noted, adoption of the same laws in 
a different country leads to unanticipated and often ineffective results. 
While the French and other civil codes were based on a deductive system of 
law and Enlightenment values, including positive rights protection, they 
 
 
284 See generally BRIAN TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 
(Cambridge Univ. 2006). 
285 See LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, supra note 21, at 85. 
286 See id. at 86 (discussing the inductive process by which common law judges derive general 
principles from precedents) and 98 (discussing the aim of preserving peace). 
287 See id. at 74-88 (cited in MILHAUPT & PISTOR at 11).  See also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (study describing how 
fence-in/fence-out customs developed in the Western United States territories in the absence of legal 
entities to resolve cattle/sheep herder disputes). 
288 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, supra note 21, at 5, 11, and 21. 
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also include the principle that all law must be legislated. The deleterious 
effect of this system is that it is not predicated on an integrated system of 
checks and balances (as developed organically in the common law), and it 
prohibits interpretation by inductive reasoning, making the civil law less 
flexible and hence more centralized than common law. As a result, civilian 
theory-based, top-down legal systems have been at a disadvantage when it 
comes to protecting individual liberty and economic freedom.  
Consistent with Roger Scruton’s predictions, England ultimately voted 
for Brexit because voters were dissatisfied with the disadvantages that have 
come from following Brussels’s dictates: a lack of sovereignty and insults 
to what they traditionally viewed as their Rule of Law.  
The rule of law bakes no bread, it is unable to distribute loaves or 
fishes (it has none), and it cannot protect itself against external 
assault, but it remains the most civilized and least burdensome 
conception of a state yet to be devised.289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
289 OAKESHOTT, supra note 22, at 178. 
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